Picking up the Pieces of the U.S. 460 Fiasco

Aubrey Layne
Aubrey Layne

by James A. Bacon

Transportation Secretary Aubrey Layne said today he suspended work on the U.S. 460 Connector project because he didn’t want to run the risk of paying the contractor millions of dollars for work on a project that might be radically revised. The state of Virginia has spent $300 million already on the proposed 55-mile interstate-grade highway with no guarantees that it can obtain the necessary environmental permits to push the $1.4 billion project forward — or get its money back if the permits don’t come through.

“There’s no point in spending money on a road we don’t know will get built,” he said at the monthly Commonwealth Transportation Board (CTB) meeting. “There will be five alternatives looked at, including a no-build option.”

As a member of the CTB before he joined the McAuliffe administration as transportation chief, Layne had been one of the project’s most vocal backers. He reiterated his support today. “I still believe in the purpose and need – increased mobility in the corridor, support of the port, hurricane evacuation,” he said.

But Layne suspended work on the mega-project late last week, citing concerns that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers might not give its approval. The Corps had expressed concerns from the very beginning about the impact of the proposed alignment on wetlands, he said. Early on, the best guess was that 200 acres of wetlands might be disrupted. But soil borings showed that nearly the entire route transversed wetlands. “It was discovered that it could be 480 acres,” he said.

When Layne took over as transportation secretary, he explained, he adopted a different perspective from his previous role as CTB member, advocate and chairman of the 460 Funding Corporation, the entity created to float toll-backed bonds to help pay for the project. As chairman of the funding corporation, he had a fiduciary responsibility to look out for the interests of the bond holders. As transportation secretary, he has a responsibility to look out for the interests of citizens and taxpayers.

To date the state has spent roughly $300 million on the project. VDOT accounts for roughly $60 million in project management costs. The contractor, US 460 Mobility, has spent about $100 million on environmental work, and the state has paid it roughly $140 million for “mobilization,” preparing for construction by setting up an office and hiring crews. He doesn’t have any more environmental work for the contractor, and he doesn’t want to continue paying millions of dollars for months on end when there is no certainty that the proposed route will win regulatory approval.

Problems with P3s. CTB members were generally supportive yesterday of Layne’s decision. Earlier this week, however, former Transportation Secretary Sean Connaughton was quoted in the Washington Post as saying, “Preliminary studies show around 400 acres impacted over a 55-mile corridor, which is fairly small given the size and scope of the project. The current Administration needs to complete the supplemental study, design a wetlands mitigation and avoidance strategy, get the Army Corps permit, and build the road. It’s that simple.” He also said there was “no problem with the structure of the contract” with US 460 Mobility.

In a lengthy explanation of the background to the deal, Layne offered a different spin. “From my viewpoint, it was people in their particular positions making the best decisions they had with the data they had,” he said. However, he alluded to the inherent tension between confidentiality and openness in the Public Private Partnership (P3) process.

The process was open in the early stage when an advisory group studied broad approaches to the 460 corridor. Based on that group’s recommendations, three different consortia submitted their proposals on how to finance and build the highway. In the end, the McDonnell administration decided they were all too expensive and took over ownership of the proposed highway, enlisting US 460 Mobility only to design and build the project. Those negotiations occurred totally in secret, as allowed by the P3 law. The McDonnell administration was not required to obtain CTB approval to sign the contract (although the CTB did have to allocate money for the project), and VDOT gave the CTB what Layne characterized as a “high-level briefing.” “The CTB,” he added, “was not privy to the terms of the contract.”

W. Sheppard Miller III expressed frustration with the process that he did not voice publicly at the time: “I have been very uncomfortable on a couple of projects we had. I didn’t have the data I needed to make a decision. At the same time, I was asked to vote. Don’t ask me to do something without giving me the information I needed. I voted like everyone else. I didn’t like it. I was very uncomfortable at the time. I don’t want to be in that position again.”

Is the money gone for good? CTB members also were concerned what financial exposure the state might have after suspending work on the project. The state financed some of its expenditures by issuing $90 million in toll-backed bonds so far. But delays in the building the toll road means there will be delays on collecting toll revenue to pay interest and principle on the bonds. Would the funding corporation be able to meet its obligations?

John W. Lawson, VDOT’s chief financial officer, said that the bond deal was structured to give the Commonwealth a $9 million “ramp up reserve fund.” Also, he said, the Virginia Transportation Infrastructure Bank has extended an $80 million line of credit. “There are substantial resources in place to support the debt service.”

It is unclear whether the state can claw back some of the money it paid US 460 Mobility. Layne said it might be possible to negotiate something with the contractor, although there are no guarantees the state could recoup its money because the contractor “was acting in good faith that the project would proceed.” At the same time, the state has to weigh the possibility of damages to the contractor from suspending the work.

“Should we have had a better assessment of risk when the contract was signed?” he asked rhetorically in speaking to Bacon’s Rebellion. “That’s subject to debate.”


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16 responses to “Picking up the Pieces of the U.S. 460 Fiasco”

  1. Again, see Penn State law professor Ellen Dannin’s “crumbling Infrastructure, Crumbling Democracy: Infrastructure Privatization Contracts and Their Effects on State and Local Governance.”

    Today, it was apparent that Sec Layne was connecting some terrifying dots, implying that some, at least, of the insights Ms Dannin has discovered over a dozen prior P3 contracts are showing up in Connaughton’s 460 contract with the 460 Mobility Partners.

    1. I’m not really opposed to P3 per se – or to be clear – the involvement of the private sector in proposing, designing and building…even operating and maintaining infrastructure and charging tolls for it.

      I support toll roads in general in fact. I think in order for a toll road to be successful – there must be a demonstrated “need” vice a “paper” need. If a road is truly needed, people will be willing to pay to use it and in my view, that’s where our focus should be – even for roads that may not end up as toll roads – they need to be studied to see if they have sufficient true need that they COULD operate as a toll road. Otherwise -the whole idea of determining “need” is basically a charade.

      with the advent of transponders and photo capture of license plates – there is no reason to not toll new infrastructure … and it not only presents opportunities for funding infrastructure – but fast tracking it with a PPP and to use tolling to actually manage congestion e.g. HOT lanes, etc.
      we should do this.

      but I’m opposed to any structuring of ANY arrangements in such a way that it becomes an either/or proposition with regard to the public’s access to the analysis of the proposal because it’s a PPP and by using the “proprietary” aspect as essentially a general-purpose shield of information from the public.

      if a proposal is so proprietary that the public and even CTB members and resource agencies cannot get access then it’s not a proposal that VDOT should be doing from the get go and that approach has to be reined in. We need to rid VDOT folks who think like this and to reform VDOT institutionally on this point.

      it’s bad policy from several perspectives but the worst is the idea that the public, CTB, Army Corp cannot know much less comment or get answers to questions on things the public is paying for.

      Can you tell I get steamed about this? When I first saw this kind of behavior a decade or so back on a project near me, I was at first taken aback by the anti-public attitude but then I got angry about it and still am. This is how VDOT creates not just opposition to one project but opposition to their way of doing business once someone realizes that this anti-public approach is institutional.

      the other thing – is that most PPP proposals or at least when PPP initially became an option – the idea was that something would be built – and the public would be paying a toll.. the Cville proposal was basically a design-build arrangement – conducted largely in secret. there were no tolls.. it was not even one of the studied alternatives. There were no other alternatives.. VDOT chose what they wanted without any visibility or accountability to the public contrary to the entire intent not only of NEPA but basic dealings with the public that one would expect from any government agency.

      and make no mistake – you don”t have this kind of conduct without the leaders of VDOT and the Governor – knowing and being complicit and to McAuliffe’s and Lanes credit – they have done what should have been done a long time ago.

      1. Larry, I agree with most of what you say here with one reservation. I’m not sure how committed VDOT staff was to some of these big projects. My impression of the C-ville Bypass and U.S. 460 is that these were politically motivated projects driven from the governor’s office and secretary’s office. They told VDOT to jump, and they said, “How high?”

        1. Sort of like Dulles Rail? The project that is late and over-budget.

          1. Tysons Engineer Avatar
            Tysons Engineer

            One note huh?

            Explain how its over budget btw, might as well call you on that bit. Do you find it fun to just come on this site and lie to people?

          2. TE, In 2006, MWAA estimated the cost for Phase 1 at $2.0 billion. http://www.dullesmetro.com/pdfs/Mar06_DullesCostEstimate.pdf

            In 2012, MWAA’s estimate was $2.8 billion. http://www.dullesmetro.com/pdfs/12MAR6_ProjectOverview_FINAL.PDF

            Please explain how the extra $800 million is not a cost overrun from what MWAA projected in 2006? Proponents said it would cost less than what it will cost. How is this a lie on my part? It would appear you are still angry that no one in Fairfax County takes you seriously. Weren’t you the guy who argued Routes 7 and 123 should not be widened? How is that argument coming, anyway?

          3. Tysons Engineer Avatar
            Tysons Engineer

            Cost over runs occur after a project goes to bid. That increase in cost prior to bid, included in the estimate, was created out of changes to what was required due to national safety standards from the 2009 red line crash. Not to mention as time goes by things get more expensive at approximately 2-3% per year.

            Perhaps you should read up on it instead of saying there are “cost over runs” when that term is not accurate.

        2. We had a proposal for a bypass up our way a few years back – and I was a bit dismayed because it was cutting across a remote section of river – however my view was that if it needed to happen – then so be it but I did want to see an honest study down and alternatives looked at.

          That was not to be and what convinced me something was amiss with the process was that three Federal resource agencies were opposed to VDOT’s preferred path. Then Natioinal Park Service, the Army Corp and the EPA were all opposed to the project and urged less damaging alternatives.. VDOT basically told all three to get lost… and was just waiting for FHWA to issue a Record of Decision.. FHWA then refused to do it and required a Supplemental Study. Supplemental may sound cursory – but it’s not when FHWA uses in the context of NEPA.

          VDOT just went ahead and had the CTB select a corridor…

          it went back and forth much like the Cville Bypass until FHWA put a choke-hold on it.. and VDOT has never forgotten it …kept it in their 6yr plan and continued to fund it even after that until the MPO voted to remove it from their plan – which effectively meant it could not receive any Federal funding…

          It’s the same folks who handled the Cville issue. Yes.. there are higher-ups involved but this agency of VDOT – Planning – has a reputation … pursued the Western Transportation Corridor and now the Dulles Airport access.. Bi-county parkway, etc.

          Now.. I was never opposed to ANY path… I was reconciled to something needing to be done – but it’s the way they went about it that turned me against …the same thing that got 3 other Federal agencies against.

          I’d be the very first to admit that major new location roads are almost impossible to build now days because of NIMBY… but to me that’s all the more reason to honestly engage the public and not play the games seen in Cville where VDOT’s actions further undermined people’s trust in their behavior when it comes to controversial roads.

          New roads get built all the time – so it’s not like no one will agree to any road.. but if you’re the lead agency and some tough decisions need to be made and people and businesses displaced – you have to have a reputation where people trust you when you say there is a “need”. You have to tell the truth and when you don’t – you lose the trust, not just existing opponents but others that might have supported you.

          and that’s their problem.. they see the process as an adversarial one where they need to run over their opponents instead of winning over supporters.. and the folks they’ll run over.. if they can include other Federal and State agencies as well as local elected – and citizens.

          I want to see an agency that I trust to provide the facts that justify their actions… and I think members of the CTB and the public want it also.

      2. I’m mot opposed to P3’s Either but what happens is the P3 lawyers write both sides of the contract and, of course, they CYA. For example, it is highly likely that if the 460 toll road is ever used for hurricane evac (one key reason connaguhton gave), 460 mobility Partners would charge VA taxpayers for every car … And it s probable that if, for example, VA ever tried to build a commuter rail line in the area, VA taxpayers would have t compensate 460 Mobility Partners…and it is highly likely that Layne is recognizing those kinds of things. He was VERY clear that, as a CTB member, and as head of the funding agency, he was not allowed to see Connaughton’s contract.

        Again, see Penn State law professor Ellen Dannin’s “crumbling Infrastructure, Crumbling Democracy: Infrastructure Privatization Contracts and Their Effects on State and Local Governance.”

        1. re: ” He was VERY clear that, as a CTB member, and as head of the funding agency, he was not allowed to see Connaughton’s contract.”

          yup. you can’t have a state agency that operates that way.

          In VDOT’s case – it’s like shouting out that the CTB is a bunch of clueless chumps who are supposed to rubber stamp.

          that’s insulting and demeaning not only to the CTB but to the public.

          Why our marvelous GA who sees fit to require women to be vaginally probed cannot screw up their courage to keep VDOT from screwing the CTB and the public – is disgusting…

  2. re: ” “There will be five alternatives looked at, including a no-build option.”

    ” “I have been very uncomfortable on a couple of projects we had. I didn’t have the data I needed to make a decision. At the same time, I was asked to vote. Don’t ask me to do something without giving me the information I needed. I voted like everyone else. I didn’t like it. I was very uncomfortable at the time. I don’t want to be in that position again.”

    this is what happens when you do not do an honest NEPA study and follow the process – to truly gather facts and data and compare alternatives and how well each alternative adheres to the stated purpose and need – which includes allowing the resource agencies and the public to participate.

    Connhaugton apparently fine with the “we don’t want no stinking NEPA” approach inside of VDOT (and give him his due – he did make things happen – but without some collateral damage).

    Lane is going to be bumping heads with the part of VDOT that has tried nightly to ignore NEPA analyses but it sounds like he has got allies and supporters and the cat is out of the bag when more than one CTB member has the backbone to object to the “make me vote on something I do not understand” practices of VDOT.

    The public largely does not trust VDOT on major new road proposals these days – and for good reason – the same one the CTB members have given.

  3. Peter Galuszka Avatar
    Peter Galuszka

    Good piece.
    What always struck me as odd was why Connaughton and McDonnell insisted on fast tracking the road next to US 460. The only reason seemed to be to do it before McD left office. That’s not a very sound reason and suggests there are other motives.

    1. My suspicion is that they calculated that if the state got committed deeply enough — to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars — it would be politically impossible for the next administration to back out.

    2. DJRippert Avatar
      DJRippert

      Agree. Follow the money. Who is behind Rt 460 mobility? Who is American Infrastructure? American Infrastructure’s web site claims it has, ” … more than 2,000 skilled craftsmen, equipment operators and construction professionals covering six states …”. Why did the state of Virginia have to pay $140M in mobilization costs for “preparing for construction by setting up an office and hiring crews”? Who appointed American Infrastructure’s CEO – Ross Myers – to be on the Advisory Board at Virginia Tech? What is the Virginia Transportation Construction Alliance and why has American Infrastructure been a donor to that state-level PAC? Why has the Va Transportation Construction Alliance donated $724,029 over the past 20 years to various Virginia politicians and other PACs (including almost $100K in 2013 alone)? Why has American Infrastructure been so generous to a single Va State Senator – John Watkins (on the Transportation and Finance committees)? Finally, what is the Citizens for Better Transportation and what did they do with the vast sum of money they raised in 2002 (but seem to have never disbursed)?

      Is that the acrid stench of crony capitalism I am smelling or is it just my imagination?

      Also, since nothing is illegal in Virginia I’ll wager that no laws were broken.

  4. billsblots Avatar
    billsblots

    DJR thanks for that info, doubtless just a tip of the iceberg. While there is waste and arrogance in small pockets of VDOT as larry rightly points out, I think much of the mention in recent articles about VDOT’s bumbling and ramming through of these road projects is not actually in VDOT, but at a higher level of politics and back room crony shenanigans. It is likely a greater sphere of transportation, political and financial interests rather than VDOT itself trying to ram through certain projects. What VDOT probably has been directed to accomplish has been blessed and well backed by forces and deep pockets lurking in the shadows.

  5. Jim,
    Kudos to you, this is really good journalism.

    I don’t have much else to add but I like what I’m hearing from Aubrey Lane. He sounds like a man of high integrity.

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