Melting Metrics

The General Assembly enacted the 2005 Restructuring Act with the idea of holding public universities accountable to a set of performance metrics. Many measures have fallen by the wayside.

This is the third of four articles exploring higher-education accountability in Virginia since enactment of the 2005 “Restructuring Higher Education Financial and Administrative Services Act.”

Upon becoming governor in 2002, Mark Warner made higher education a top priority. An entrepreneur who had made his fortune in cell phones, he saw Virginia’s colleges and universities as vital institutions for preparing a technology-ready workforce and for creating R&D-based innovation centers. He arranged a $900 million state-backed bond initiative to pay for a college building program, and he pushed through a tax increase to offset the spending cuts he’d enacted previously to balance a recession-hammered budget.

Warner paid keen attention to higher ed issues. In 2003 Virginia became one of five states to join the National Collaborative for Postsecondary Education Policy. The ensuing discussions brought another priority to the fore — the gap in access to higher education experienced by different races and ethnic groups. African-Americans and Hispanics lagged the population in college attendance, and given the increasing proportion of minorities in the college-bound population, lawmakers worried that the disparity in access could get even worse.

At the same time, Virginia’s public universities had their own agendas, which entailed winning more freedom from regulation and less state meddling with tuition. In 2005, Warner and the higher-ed establishment struck a grand bargain enshrined in the “2005 Restructuring Act” — universities would get more autonomy, and Warner would get more accountability.

“Restructuring was a historic effort by the Commonwealth to establish a new relationship that would both help to ensure the viability and the effectiveness of public higher education for the citizens of the Commonwealth,” says Peter Blake, director of the State Council of Higher Education for Virginia (SCHEV).

The legislation enshrined eleven goals, to which a twelfth was added after the 2007 Virginia Tech massacre. Public institutions would:

  1. Ensure access to higher education, including meeting enrollment demand.
  2. Ensure affordability, regardless of income.
  3. Provide a broad range of academic programs.
  4. Maintain high academic standards.
  5. Improve student retention and progress toward timely graduation.
  6. Develop uniform articulation agreements with community colleges.
  7. Stimulate economic development.
  8. Increase externally funded research and improve technology transfer.
  9. Work actively with K-12 to improve student achievement.
  10. Prepare a six-year financial plan.
  11. Meet financial and administrative management standards.
  12. Ensure the safety and security of students on college campuses.

The 2005 Restructuring Act put the Governor and Secretary of Finance in charge of developing financial and administrative measures, and tasked SCHEV with devising and tracking metrics for the other goals. SCHEV would publish an “Assessment of Institutional Performance” every year that ascertained whether or not institutions met the goals. Falling short would jeopardize a college’s access to revenue sources estimated in 2008 to be worth about $60 million across Virginia’s higher-ed system. (The incentives have declined to less than $20 million in recent years.)

After the law passed, the state began diligently devising metrics and compiling data, some of which SCHEV had been collecting already, and Virginia’s public colleges and universities incorporated the state goals into their own planning processes. Several years later, the 2011 “Preparing for the Top Jobs of the 21 Century” act, modified the goals, establishing an objective of increasing the number of degrees awarded by 100,000 over 15 years. Top Jobs put an emphasis on STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Math) and health disciplines.

We saw in Part II of this series that the 2005 Restructuring Act has brought some tangible financial benefits to Virginia’s colleges and universities. In exchange, the state expected to hold them accountable for achieving the 12 state goals. How did those goals translate into metrics? How carefully did the state keep track of those metrics? And what happened if and when institutions fell short?

While outside observers hoped that the new covenant between the Commonwealth and its higher-ed system might provide a new model for the nation, administering the 2005 Restructuring Act proved more difficult than anyone anticipated. The accountability-by-metrics piece bogged down in a legislative-bureaucratic morass.

SCHEV and the Secretariat of Finance still monitor student enrollment and degrees granted, and they track an array of financial and administrative measures for the institutions that have signed Level II and Level III autonomy agreements. SCHEV compiles these limited metrics in biennial performance reviews for each institution. Further, SCHEV maintains a rich database of higher-education statistics, much of which is relevant to the 12 state goals, and it publishes metrics for a strategic plan, the Virginia Plan for Higher Education.

But changes implemented over the years have undercut accountability. Hewing to directives from governors and the General Assembly, SCHEV no longer sets benchmarks or monitors metrics for all 12 state goals at each college and university. If institutions fall short of metrics that SCHEV does track, they suffer no public rebuke. Most significantly, while Virginia’s higher-ed system continues to meet some state goals, the apparatus put into place by the 2005 Restructuring Act has proven unable to rein in tuition cost increases or prevent a crisis of middle-class affordability.  

The JLARC report. Since enactment of the Restructuring Act  in 2005, the Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission (JLARC) is the only state entity to have taken a comprehensive look at the accountability question. In 2008 the law was still fresh in the minds of lawmakers and administrators, stakeholders were taking it seriously, and progress was being made in implementing it. The 2008 review of Level III institutions (those with the most autonomy) found that SCHEV had devised “fully developed performance measures” for seven of its goals but not for the others.

The most detailed accounting came from the secretariats of Finance and Administration, which devised 17 metrics showing compliance with state financial and administrative standards. Some metrics were simple. Did an institution have an unqualified opinion from the auditor? Did it have a AA- bond rating? Did it comply with Small Women and Minority (SWAM) procurement guidelines?

Other metrics required data collection and analysis. Was voluntary employee turnover comparable to that of state employees? Was an institution using the state’s Internet-based procurement system for at least 80% of its purchases? Did an institution pay competitive rates for leased office space? Did it limit project change orders to 2% of the guaranteed price?

While the JLARC was generally positive about the progress made in implementing the 2005 Restructuring Act, the report acknowledged that considerable work remained to be done. One of JLARC’s recommendations would prove prophetic:

The oversight process needs improvement to address concerns quickly and ensure the transfer of institutional memory between gubernatorial administrations. A restructuring advisory committee or an expanded leadership role for [SCHEV] could improve the oversight process.

That recommendation was never acted upon. No advisory committee was formed. The General Assembly never gave SCHEV more resources. But administrations did change.

Complications and delays. When SCHEV embarked upon the task of developing metrics and benchmarks for the state goals, complications quickly arose. Initially, staff thought to set up standardized goals that applied to everyone, recalls Jim Alessio, who worked eight years as SCHEV’s in-house “Restructuring Act” expert. But it quickly became apparent that setting identical goals would be unfair to certain institutions.

For example, says Alessio, the University of Virginia had a six-year graduation rate exceeding 90%. Norfolk State University’s graduation rate hovered around 30%. The two universities had radically different student bodies and widely disparate resources. UVa’s graduation rate was so high, it was almost impossible to improve; if it fell a percentage point, it was still a stellar performer. By contrast, NSU needed dramatic gains in student retention. Accordingly, SCHEV began negotiating goals with each institution.

Other problems arose from the built-in time lags involved with selecting metrics, establishing benchmarks, and then measuring against the benchmarks. The Restructuring Act went into effect in July 2005. It took a year for SCHEV to develop and approve base-line metrics. But because the 2006-2007 academic year had already begun by then, it it did not seem appropriate to develop challenging targets that year.

By then, Tim Kaine was governor, says Alessio. The new team knew little about the Restructuring Act. A key provision of the law needed to be ironed out to allow universities to apply for Level II status and gain more autonomy for IT, capital projects and procurement. Amid the administration’s other priorities, that task fell between the cracks for two years, says Alessio. Consequently, institutions could not apply for Level II status those two years, as the legislation had allowed.

Meanwhile, SCHEV was trying to apply the metrics that people could agree upon. The first year, the Council set easy goals on the grounds that everyone was still getting familiar with the process. “The first year was more of a run-through,” says Alessio. Every institution passed.

In 2008, SCHEV tightened the standards. Four institutions — Longwood University, Virginia Commonwealth University, Virginia State University, and the University of Virginia at Wise — failed one or more of the measures. Alessio took the data to the Council, and heated discussions ensued. Some members were reluctant to sanction the colleges: Withdrawing resources would only make their job harder.

Institutions began arguing that they couldn’t meet the goal because of factors beyond their control. When the Council gave special dispensation to one college, that made it harder to refuse to cutting another institution slack. For instance, says Alessio, one university missed its enrollment target because a key manager had suffered a series of personal crises. The institution’s local delegate successfully pleaded its case to SCHEV. The other legislators began standing up for their institutions as a constituent service.

Instead of taking a hard-line approach, SCHEV began requiring institutions to submit improvement plans for measures in which they had fallen short. SCHEV contends that the approach has worked out well.

Top Jobs. By 2011 the business community had developed a consensus that the state needed to make a sustained investment in the higher-ed system. Governor Bob McDonnell established a Governor’s Commission on Higher Education Reform, Innovation and Investment and loaded it with prominent business leaders, educators and elected officials.

The commission’s report, “Preparing Virginia for the Top Jobs of the 21st Century,” enumerated new higher-ed goals that would be incorporated into the so-called “Top Jobs Act” of 2011. The new law set a goal of having Virginia’s public colleges and universities confer an additional 100,000 degrees over the next fifteen years. Special attention would be given to high-demand, high-earning disciplines such as STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) and healthcare.

While signing on to the STEM priority, the McDonnell administration had very different ideas about how to hold state colleges accountable — and they did not involve SCHEV.

G. Gilmer Minor III, the soon-to-retire SCHEV chair, was appointed to the council in 2009, just before Governor Bob McDonnell took office. The Council’s survival was precarious. “Literally, the Secretary of the Commonwealth said, ‘We’re appointing you to SCHEV but we can’t promise it’s going to survive,” Minor recalls.

Having served as chair of the Virginia Military Institute board, Minor knew first-hand the low regard SCHEV was held in at that time. A series of executive directors had served short terms, he says, and the Council was perceived as adversarial. It had lost the confidence of the universities and policy makers. “At VMI,” he says, “SCHEV was not the partner, it was almost the enemy.”

There was a strong sentiment in Republican circles for shrinking state government, and the unpopular SCHEV looked expendable. But the state couldn’t just cut the colleges loose. The only alternative was centralizing authority with a board of regents, and that wasn’t palatable either. At the end of the day, says Minor, “McDonnell said, ‘let’s make a more effective SCHEV.'”

In time, SCHEV’s status as a state agency did stabilize, and the agency regained credibility with lawmakers. While the administration was thinking through SCHEV’s future and establishing its own educational priorities, however, it put the original 2005 Restructuring Act metrics “on hold” for two years, says Alessio. Legislators retained the 12 higher-ed goals articulated back in the Warner administration, but they pared the number of academic-related measures in half.

For purposes of compiling the Assessments of Institutional Performance, SCHEV then began tracking performance against only six goals for each college and university, the first five of which applied to in-state students:

  • Undergraduate enrollment
  • Associate and bachelor degrees awarded
  • STEM-H degrees awarded
  • Upper-level, program-placed FTE students
  • Two-year transfers to four-year institutions
  • Degrees awarded to under-represented populations

SCHEV had to establish new base-lines, and then wait another year to gather data to compare. Alessio departed SCHEV in 2013 just as the organization was beginning to evaluate the data. In 2014, nine years after the enactment of the 2005 Restructuring Act, SCHEV finally published its first Biennial Assessment of Institutional Performance. The Council published its second assessment in 2016.

The missing metric. The second goal listed in the legislation was to “ensure affordability, regardless of income.” Early on, the focus was on achieving affordability for lower-income students, which several public institutions have addressed by raising funds available for financial aid. But as colleges aggressively raised tuition — in part to pay for the financial aid — legislators have become agitated about affordability for the middle class.

You’d think “affordability” would be a simple term to define — how much do you charge, says Tony Maggio, a fiscal analyst for the House Appropriations Committee who is sympathetic to the concern about higher tuition.

But how much do you charge for what? A four-year degree? If so, he asks, how do you account for a 2+2 program covering two years in community college and two more in a four-year institution? (In the 2014-15 school year, nearly 12,000 community college students transferred to four-year institutions.) What about dual high school/college enrollments? It gets complicated, he says.

Another complication is measuring the cost of attendance before and after financial aid. In 2015 Virginia colleges and universities doled out $188 million in financial aid (not including grants, loans and scholarships from private and government sources). That need-based assistance went mostly to lower-income students. So, the question becomes, affordability for whom?

Adding complexity to any calculation is the reality that not all four-year degrees are created equal. Does the University of Virginia offer the same educational value-added as, say, Virginia Military Institute or Norfolk State University? “Each one has their own value proposition,” says Minor. “How much is that worth? What am I getting for the cost? Nobody talks about that. “

These dilemmas stymied SCHEV and legislators alike. SCHEV did develop an affordability measure, which it applied for the the first and last time in 2011. The Top Jobs Act put the metric on hold, and it never resurfaced as part of the performance evaluations.

And SCHEV does publish an annual Tuition & Fee Report (see the 2016-2017 report), which shows system-wide trends. The chart below, taken from that report, shows that average undergraduate charges have consumed an increasing share of Virginians’ per capita disposable income since 2000, reaching 47.6% last year.

The same report lists tuition, fees, room and board for individual colleges and universities , and the Virginia Plan for Higher Education also describes metrics for “affordability” and “price” for the state system as a whole.

SCHEV Director Blake insists that the system does hold institutions accountable for tuition increases. It is true “in a very linear sense” that there are no formal accountability measures for individual institutions, he says. But policy makers can access extensive sources of data on affordability and cost. These data surface in behind-the-scenes discussions between governors, legislators and university presidents that the public never hears about.

But SCHEV does not hold individual institutions accountable to affordability benchmarks. The Council undertakes no formal review, passes no judgment and enacts no sanctions. State code states clearly that setting tuition is the sole prerogative of the Boards of Visitors of colleges and universities themselves.

“No one is tackling affordability because no one wants to touch the third rail, tuition,” says Maggio, the House fiscal analyst. “No one is willing to say, what are you charging, and are you charging too much?”

Shifting, toothless goals. Jim Alessio administered the 2005 Restructuring Act for eight years as a one-man show with assistance from other SCHEV staff members. He started with great enthusiasm but became disillusioned as he encountered endless delays and setbacks. New governors brought new priorities and staffed their administrations with new people who had little institutional knowledge.

Priorities change. The goals that animated Warner in 2005 were of little interest to McDonnell in 2011. And who is going to remember McDonnell’s priorities in 2025, asks Alessio. “Some new governor will come along and look at this differently. Will anyone care if the 100,000 additional degree goal is met?”

Also, he asks rhetorically, “Is anybody watching? Is anyone going to the institutions and saying they aren’t moving fast enough?”

No, they aren’t, he answers. The law has no teeth. “There’s nothing in there to say what happens if we don’t make the goal.”

In the fourth part of this series we will explore what the data tell us about enrollment, affordability, access, retention, research and other key goals.

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19 responses to “Melting Metrics

  1. A couple of points:

    A.) This particular article demonstrates the peril in a weak, one-term Governor and a state controlled by the legislature. My own hunch is that if Warner was eligible and won re-election in 2005, this Act would have been fully implemented; and

    B.) If we want to continue with this ancient system of the legislature being so powerful AND part-time, then we need to acknowledge that state gov’t is really just an appropriation/wealth redistribution machine. There is no way that a part-time legislature can truly govern 21st century institutions. That’s ludicrous. As Mr. Rippert has commented, we need to institute home rule for localities and scrap the Dillon Rule. I’d take it a step farther and give certain universities charter status. Basically, they get “home rule” for 10 years and come back every decade for a review.

  2. The Dillon Rule is truly appreciated by most local officials as it provides them with an excuse when they don’t want to do something. I’ve ever heard Gerry Connolly explain unpopular land use decisions with “The Dillon Rule prohibits Fairfax County from denying rezoning requests.” Given the general lack of understanding of local government among Fairfax County’s highly educated citizens, most people bought Connolly’s line and he was off the hook.

    The last constitutional convention, albeit some years ago, approached Virginia’s localities with a proposal to remove the strong Dillon Rule. They were told leave it in.

    Whether this same result would occur today is unknown. But it’s removal would take away the great excuse – We’d do this, but we are a Dillon Rule state. I suspect most local officials would like to see the Dillon Rule relaxed for administrative matters, but retained for other local government purposes. I know a number of state legislators from both parties who would be open to a change like this. Some worry home rule would bring anti-business regulations from some local governments.

    I like the fact that Fairfax County’s supervisors have only restricted powers. That likely limits its abilities to engage in more costly programs and impose more taxes. Checks and balances are good for America and its states.

    • Gerry Connolly is long gone from any local or state responsibilities, TMT. Time to move on.

      The Constitutional Convention was held in 1968 – 1969. Yes, that was “some time ago”. The convention was never held to focus on intra-state governance. It was held to finally shred the truly horrible 1902 Constitution in the face of Brown vs the Board of Education, The Civil Rights Act, The 24th Amendment, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, etc. Your characterization of that convention as a well reasoned discussion of Virginia’s governance system falls very short. It was a very late panicked reaction of Virginia’s Richmond elite FINALLY realizing that they were on the wrong side of history and we absolutely doomed to lose their mindless fight with the federal government.

      You like a strict interpretation of Dillon’s Rule because you are a conservative living in a liberal area. You’re happy that your minority opinion can be forced on your neighbors through the unlimited powers of Richmond. Not a very democratic perspective.

      • I know several Democratic elected officials who would not support home rule. I’ve heard them say the Dillon Rule should be relaxed for administrative matters, such as the color of school bus roofs (State Delegate’s example, not mine), but not for matters dealing with regulation and taxes. The Delegate, no conservative, indicated a lack in trust in local officials. Sort of like Judge Dillon.

        I’ve done considerable legal work (federal issues) for local governments around Virginia and never heard them complain about the Dillon Rule. They’ve recognized it, but know how to operate successfully within it. Local governments with home rule powers would be giving even more taxpayer money to hanger’s on and taxing ordinary people more to pay for it. Under the Dillon Rule, Fairfax County is loath to use eminent domain. With home rule, it would only be a matter of time before the BoS authorized it for urbanization and the like.

        People who want local governments with expansive powers should move to states that allow this. And hold on to your wallets.

      • Keep in mind that, under the American system of government, only states have sovereignty. Local governments, even in home rule states, have only the power granted to them by the state constitution and the statutes.

        • The world is moving at a rapid pace towards city-states. This is going on across the globe. People are realizing that they prefer that the most concentrated government power rest in the hands of those closest to them. I don’t see any ideological divide on this point.

          If anything should go, it should be states. I can rationalize the feds for defense, a currency, some environmental regulations….I can rationalize my local gov’t for schools, streets, courts, police, fire, etc.

          Outside of VDOT, there isn’t a single state function that isn’t just wealth distribution/appropriations.

          I have friends in both parties and they all tend to agree that they’d rather pay more local taxes if it meant more local control. They’re split when it comes to federal taxes: GOP wants less, D’s ok as it is or want slightly more. But none of them see much sense in paying Richmond to take Urban Crescent dollars just to give them to rural Virginia and basically do nothing else of importance except to maintain roads.

          • TooManyTaxes

            LGG – I agree that, at least in concept, people want more local control. They want to know who is responsible for what and to know how to get the “responsible who” to make a decision. But I don’t think the want is to coalesce around city-states, which I assume to mean metro areas. If I’m wrong on that point, please correct me and point me to some support I can review.

            What I observe from McLean-northern Fairfax County is residents would like to control land use in McLean, rather than have Fairfax County do it; control police and public safety services for the area; control schools so that local schools don’t have the largest class sizes around; etc. I know many would like to be able to control local roads that are plagued with cut-through traffic, much of which is going between Tysons and Maryland. I suspect people in Annandale, Oakton, Chantilly, Springfield and Centreville feel the same way about local control. And as Fairfax County residents complain about subsidizing RoVA, many residents of Greater McLean and Great Falls complain about subsidizing Fairfax County.

            I think a state or city-state that covered Washington, Montgomery County, Prince Georges County, Arlington, Fairfax, Prince William and Loudoun Counties, along with the cities of Alexandria, Falls Church, Fairfax, Manassas and Manassas Park would soon leave many people as frustrated as they are with the NoVA-RoVA situation.

        • Where was Judge Dillon from? And how has that state reacted to the wit and wisdom of their native son?

          Hint: He was from Iowa

          https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Home_rule_in_the_United_States

          • TooManyTaxes

            Sorry, Don, not quite. In
            the Iowa supreme court wrote:

            “In 1868, the Chief Justice of the Iowa Supreme Court, John F. Dillon, declared that municipalities were creatures of the legislature and had only those powers expressly granted by the legislature. City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Missouri River R.R., 24 Iowa 455, 475 (1868). For the next hundred years, the General Assembly, through application of what became known as the Dillon Rule, maintained a tight legislative grip over municipal affairs through a combination of inaction and a jungle of code provisions. This tight legislative grip was relaxed, to some extent, in 1968, when Iowa enacted a home rule amendment to the Iowa Constitution. Iowa Const. art. III, § 38A.

            “The Iowa home rule amendment was a compromise between those who desired unlimited home rule and those who favored continued legislative control of municipal affairs. Bechtel v. City of Des Moines, 225 N.W.2d 326, 328-29 (Iowa 1975). While the Iowa home rule amendment reversed the Dillon Rule, the legislature retained the right to legislate even on matters involving local affairs. The constitutional amendment allocated no areas or subject matter exclusively for municipal control. The continued ability of the legislature after the enactment of the home rule amendment to trump or preempt local law has been repeatedly recognized by this court. Iowa Grocery Indus. Ass’n v. City of Des Moines, 712 N.W.2d 675, 678-79 (Iowa 2006); Bechtel, 225 N.W.2d at 332. Iowa’s type of home rule, sometimes referred to as legislative home rule, has been criticized by some as not providing municipalities with sufficient local autonomy. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I — The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 Colum. L.Rev. 1, 8-9 (1990).”

            The state is sovereign.

        • No. Under the US Constitution (as originally written) there were no rights assigned to cities or municipalities. The early United States was predominately rural. According to the 1790 census, 95 percent of the population lived in the countryside. The 5 percent of Americans living in urban areas (places with more than 2,500 persons) lived mostly in small villages.

          In other words, there were no cities to speak of. So, “the American system of government” didn’t address urban and suburban living because it didn’t exist.

          However, “the American system of government” allows states to decide what to do as time goes on and situations change. And many enlightened states (AL, IA, MA, MN, NV, NJ, OH and OR) have done just that. Other, more backwards states like AL, DE, MS, NB, OK, VT, VA and WY have left strong Dillon Rule implementations in place. The rest have a more hybrid form of government.

          Once again, Virginia is an outlier – one of only 8 states with a strict implementation of Dillon’s Rule. Keeping good company with Alabama, Mississippi, Oklahoma …

          As for moving … I am sure that’s what you and your ilk would have said about Virginians who objected to slavery, poll taxes, Jim Crowe, racial purity in marriage, segregation, massive resistance and Eugenics. Has there ever been a stupid idea that The Imperial Clown Show in Richmond didn’t adopt and cling to until virtually every other state abandoned it? This state has never been right and will never be right until we break down the Imperial Clown Show in Richmond and return power to where it belongs … the people.

          • TooManyTaxes

            Home Rule alone does not vest power in the people. To do that, we’d need referendum, recall, and initiative that applies to local governments. Then, we’d have as close to power vested in the people as one could get in a republic.

  3. Let me summarize the first three of these articles:

    1. The Imperial Clown Show in Richmond was busy doing what it does best … ignoring Virginia’s real problems while mindlessly micro-managing irrelevant activities like universities putting up tents.

    2. The universities came to the legislature and complained about the over-regulated Nanny State antics. Normally, the Clown Show would shrug its collective shoulders and mutter something like “Sic Semper Tyrannosaurus” to explain their indifference to change, progress or the future in general. But the offer from the universities had the captivating perfume of unaccountability about it. If there’s one thing our representatives in Richmond like more than mindless micro-management it’s shirking accountability for almost everything.

    3. A deal was struck whereby the Imperial Clown Show would shirk accountability for higher education in Virginia and the snowflakes who run our public college campuses could pursue runaway tuition increases in what would turn out to be a failed scheme to improve their standing among their peers. The only losers, as usual, were the citizens of Virginia.

    4. A patina of false accountability always helps when election time rolls around so Mark Warner was tasked with establishing a report card for The GA Unaccountability and Higher Ed Hyper-Inflation Act of 2005. Warner, also a snowflake, established a set of unmeasurable measures like “Provide a broad range of academic programs.”

    5. Next, Little Timmy Kaine (aka Governor Irrelevant) came to office and allowed problems to “fall through the cracks for two years”. By that time Gov. Irrelevant was busy interviewing for and starting his new job as head of the DNC. Gov I. would go on to establish himself as one of the country’s most useless US Senators and a key part of the worst run presidential campaign of the last 100 years. Unsurprisingly, no progress was made in higher ed.

    6. Bob McDonnell showed up next (in Virginia’s idiotic revolving door of governors) to prove that even a broken Rolex is right twice a day. He managed to resolve the metrics down to things that can be measured like “In-state STEM-H degrees awarded” But, never fear … SCHEV had no intention of tracking the metrics and it doesn’t matter because the law passed by The Imperial Clown Show in Richmond has no teeth.

    Another chapter in Virginia’s book of “State Government Incompetence.”

  4. Excellent article. I hope you will find a way to indicate what avenues there are for Virginia taxpayers to advocate for the fiscal and programmatic accountability every institution must have for good performance.

  5. Really good, thorough series.

  6. I think Jim B has done a good job with the history and chronology… and a little surprised how this morphed into a discussion about Dillon’s Rule… and the concept of Home Rule for Colleges!

    But I’m still pretty skeptical that the govt should be determining what the price of college should be and not surprised at all that they never got around to defining what “affordable” is but if you don’t do that – then what is all the rest of the stuff about? Just regulating to be regulating?

  7. Bravo, Jim Bacon, this meaty, unsexy stuff that few seem to want to scratch into with any persistence. Looking forward to next piece.

  8. Pingback: Graduation and Not, With and Without Financial Aid – CrankysBlog

  9. I think the whole concept of “affordable” with respect to any government role in it … would be worth chewing on a bit but especially so with regard to College tuition. We simply have the wrong model.. no amount of “fixing” is going to “fix” it.

    We want “affordable” health care, housing, electricity, … child care…food… etc.

    but we have a wide range of income levels such that any discussion of “affordable” becomes a conundrum so we have developed “metrics” if you will to define what we mean by “affordable” :

    Many entitlements – government subsidies – are, in turn, determined by these numbers. If you qualify – the Government (other taxpayers) provide you with a subsidy to “help’ but by no means provide you with all you want or think you need.

    Instead, they are means-tested at a percent of FPL (Federal Poverty Level):

    100% 138% 250% 400%
    1 $11,880 $15,800 ($16,400) $29,700 $47,550
    2 $16,020 $21,300 ($22,100) $40,050 $64,100
    3 $20,160 $26,800 ($27,800) $50,400 $84,650
    4 $24,300 $32,300 ($33,600) $60,750 $97,200
    5 $28,440 $37,850 ($39,250) $71,100 $113,800
    6 $32,580 $43,350 ($44,950 $81,450 $130,300
    7 $36,730 $48,850 ($50,700) $91,850 $146,900
    8 $40,890 $54,400 ($56,450) $102,250 $163,550

    So make no mistake – when we talk about “affordable” college tuition – we ought to be in this same realm – but instead we mix “affordable” with “middle class” and then have the temerity to later complain that there are no “metrics”. Well.. you start with flabby terms and it goes downhill from there!

    So we have this totally subjective concept that the State will “help” the colleges with funds if the Colleges “promise” to use those monies to help make college “affordable” to the “middle class”.

    For the most part, government does not provide any/all “help” for anything. They provide a “floor level” on a per-person basis and usually means tested and that should apply to college in my view.

    The way we do Colleges right now is akin to the Govt paying Walmart a subsidy to ensure that they will then provide “affordable” food to people.

    or for that matter – substitute any need – like health care or housing – any “need”.

    Let UVA , Tech, W&M charge whatever they think they have to for the education that they think people “need” (or “want”) but let people make their own choices about price and quality – i.e. what they can “afford” and what the government might “help” with – if they qualify on a means-tested basis.

    We keep going at this – as if – if the government throws money at something – it will result is lower costs … and I have to say – most card-carrying Conservatives and even a flock of Liberals KNOW this is not a good method!

    Yet we still “believe” it will work for colleges and we keep thinking it “will” work if only we get the “metrics” fixed.

    I don’t think the basic concept of giving a pot of money to any organization – public or private on the premise that in doing that – that entity will provide ” more “affordable” products and services… “works” and the current model in Virginia is flawed and destined to fail.. no matter how much “fixing” is done and the proof is how the process has denigrated into a bunch of government bureaucrats attempting to “regulate” higher ed on things like “exit” signs… as a way to “encourage” them to keep their tuition “affordable” for primarily the “middle class”.

    we just need to get away from the quid-pro-quo “funding” where we give a pot of money to the University on the premise that they will use it to make their prices more “affordable”.

    That’s a liberal tax and spend concept that any self-respecting Conservative should recognize it for what it is and call for it’s out right repeal!

    We need to admit that the “middle class” is wanting an entitlement just like those that are lower on the economic tier. They’re not a “special” class… that deserves different treatment!

    Get the Government out of this business.. and let the students and parents choose what they can afford and if they qualify the government can help them – but that still leaves it up to the individuals to “earn” what they want and need.

    what a concept!

  10. ALL things equal… local govt does not really need referenda or initia.. as each district elected either represents their district wishes or they won’t be in office for long…

    I’m of two minds about home rule… you need a state level framework for law… and regulations… so that we don’t have the situation like the speed limits or right-turn-on-red, etc… change per jurisdiction…

    we also need laws that require that real estate be valued and taxed in a consistent way… and not be flopping back and forth every time a new BOS gets installed…

    we already have referenda for things like bond debt and meals taxes, etc and again, it is the state that sets the standards for these… not localities…

    also – states are not totally “sovereign” they have the rights that the Fed chooses to give them..in large part because even Fed programs that are “voluntary” – like MedicAid have strings-attached “rule” that impose Fed standards… ditto with roads….pipelines… environmental law, etc…

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