Category Archives: Demographics

As Virginia Inches Toward Becoming a Majority Minority State, What Do Racial/Ethnic Classifications Mean Anymore?

Whites will comprise less than a majority of Virginia’s population by 2040 — 47.4% — according to recent projections by the Demographics Research Group at the University of Virginia. That’s down from a forecast 58.6% in 2020.

The percentage of non-Hispanic whites and blacks in the state’s population will shrink by 5.7% and 8.3% respectively, while the percentage of Asians and Hispanics will increase by 96.0% and 114.3% respectively.

To some degree, demographic projections reflect underlying demographic reality. But they also are influenced by politics and culture, as Hamilton Lombard points out in a post yesterday on the StatChat blog. “It can be easy to read too much into very long term population projections,” he warns. “All the racial/ethnic projections only make sense if you understand the haphazard way we categorize and track race in the U.S.”

For example, a large majority of Hispanic Americans self-identify as white, but the Census Bureau categorizes them as a “non-white” minority because they also identify as Hispanic. Before 1970, they were categorized as white.

But after the Civil Rights Acts of the 1960s, the National Council of La Raza successfully lobbied to have anyone with a “Spanish origin” counted as a separate ethnic population in the 1970. Armed with data for the newly categorized Hispanic population which the 1970 census supplied, organizations could apply for various grants and develop policies specifically for Hispanic Americans. Other groups, after seeing the success of La Raza, have lobbied to have various U.S. ethnic populations counted separately. As a result, the number of race/ethnic categories on the census has risen from four in 1960 to possibly nine by 2020.

Another example of how the Census Bureau shapes perceptions of ethnicity and race: Since the Census began allowing respondents to identify as more than one race in 2000, the U.S. “mixed race” population, 86% of whom select white as one of their races, has grown from zero to nearly 10 million.

Yet another example: Census has proposed counting Middle-Eastern and North-African Americans as a separate race. Because most self-identify as white, the new classification would accelerate the decline of the “white” population and increase the “non-white” population.

Bacon’s bottom line: Two mega-trends are colliding here. On the one hand, the Great American Assimilation Machine continues to do its work, eroding ethnic and racial identities. On the other hand, by creating a racial spoils system (dispensing funds and perks to non-whites), government policy creates material incentives for people to nurture separate ethnic identities.

A century ago, white ethnic identities such as English, Scotch-Irish, Irish, Italian, German, Polish, Swedish, Jewish, etc. were as strong as racial identities today. Over time, intermarriage and the dissolution of ethnic enclaves merged white Americans into the melting pot. Today, white Americans are less likely than ever to define themselves by the national origin of their ancestors and more likely than ever to simply think of themselves as generically “white.”

The Ancestry.com ads running on cable TV are a striking illustration of this trend: There would be no need to utilize DNA to identify peoples’ ethnic origins unless most people had forgotten those origins. I thought I was Hispanic and found out I was half Italian! I thought I was German and found out I’m a mutt!

Meanwhile, the rise of “multi-racial” populations is proceeding apace. According to a Pew Research Center analysis, one-in-seven U.S. infants (14%) were multiracial or multi-ethnic in 2015, nearly triple the share in 1980. This is not just a matter of “light skinned” ethnicities intermarrying. Increasingly, Americans are broaching the color line.

One would think that all but the racial purists among us would welcome this trend. But political forces are driving the population in the opposite direction. Many politicians believe that the path to political power lies in the cultivation of racial grievances. These politicians (I won’t mention names) exist in both parties. By enabling the doling out of government spoils (usually at the behest of the political party that favors activist government — but, again, I won’t mention names), the Census Bureau’s ethnic/racial classifications perpetuate the sense of separateness.

It is impossible to predict which force — assimilation or the urge to political power — will win out in the end. But we can count on one thing: Changes in politics and culture undoubtedly will influence which races and ethnicities the Census Bureau Sam counts, and, consequently, how Americans perceive themselves. In the meantime, readers should understand Census ethnic and racial classifications for what they are: increasingly meaningless distinctions imposed and maintained for political reasons.

Rural Virginians Will be Really Old by 2040

Image credit: StatChat. Click for more legible image.

Like every other state in the union, Virginia’s population is getting older. The trend is particularly pronounced in rural jurisdictions, as seen in these maps compiled by Shonel Sen with the Demographics Research Group at the University of Virginia and published in the StatChat blog.

Everyone seems so focused on immediate problems that localities have given little attention to what things will be like in 23 years when the 65+ demographic comprises more than 20% of the population across most of the state. Given the inability of most Baby Boomers to accumulate much wealth, how many of these elders be poor? Given the tendency of young people to move away, will the rural elderly have caretakers? Given the pressures on rural hospitals and the increasingly acute shortage of doctors, will the elderly have adequate access to health care?

I suppose it’s human nature to ignore distant problems until they become immediate problems, so I’m guessing nothing will be done until these issues reach crisis proportions. This is America. That’s how we roll.

Virginia as Nation’s 10th Most Populous State?

Source: StatChat blog

Virginia’s population growth has slowed in recent years, but the Old Dominion still is expected to grow faster than the nation as a whole. At current growth rates, Virginia could become the 10th most populous state in the country by 2040, according to Shonel Sen with the Demographic Research Group at the University of Virginia.

During the 2000-2010 decade, Virginia experienced an average annual growth rate of 13%. That has slowed to a 9% growth rate in the current decade, writes Sen in the StatChat blog. But the growth rate of other states has slowed as well.

In 2010, Virginia was the 12th most populous state. Assuming current trends continue, the Old Dominion should surpass New Jersey by 2030, ranking 11th. And by 2040, Virginia will surpass Michigan to become No. 10.

The thing about most trends is that eventually they end. But insofar as the governance philosophies of states remain relatively constant, and insofar as population trends reflect state-level political and economic conditions conducive to economic growth, there is a lot of inertia in population trends in states with large, diverse economies. This scenario actually could happen.

In related commentary, Sen has published a map showing how the geographic center of Virginia’s population has moved since 1940. Just before World War II, the population center was in Cumberland County. As Richmond, Hampton Roads and Northern Virginia urbanized, the center progressively moved east through 1970. Then, as Northern Virginia came to dominate economic and population growth, the center moved due north, and is projected to continue to move north, almost to Fredericksburg, by 2040.

Map credit: StatChat

Don’t Bet the Farm on Population Projections

Source: StatChat blog

The Demographics Research Group at the University of Virginia is the entity tasked with making official population projections for the Commonwealth of Virginia and its localities. Their projections feed into all manner of planning documents across the state. If the projections are off, so are the forecasts for school attendance and transportation demand. Getting the numbers right is a big responsibility.

Hamilton Lombard, a research specialist for the group, assumes an appropriate air of humility regarding long-range projections.

Forecasting population change, like forecasting the weather, is complex, requires one to make assumptions about the future, often based on past trends, and is rarely spot on,” he writes in the StatChat blog. “Because population projections are less familiar to the public, projections are often treated as something closer to a fact, rather than a forecast that can and likely will change. Unfortunately, not understanding population projections can lead to much larger problems than a rained out barbecue.

In the chart above, Lombard traces the history of state population projections for the year 2000 beginning in 1975. The 25-year projection was off by a significant margin. But, as a rule, shorter-term projections are more accurate, and the 10-year projection hit very close to the mark.

Numbers tend to be less accurate for localities because demographic trends tend to be more volatile. As an extreme example, Lombard cites, projections made of Bath County’s population jumped around 1980 when the lightly populated county experienced an influx of construction workers to build the Bath County pump storage facility. “Because of the temporary rise in Bath County’s population,” Lombard writes, “the projections expected the county’s population to keep growing, even after the 1990 census showed that most of the power plant construction workers had left.”

Bacon’s bottom line: Forecasting increased population for Bath County by projecting a trend line based on a temporary influx of construction workers was utterly foolish. Someone should have been strung up by the thumbs. Fortunately, not much was at stake (well, not much for anyone except, perhaps, the residents of Bath County). But sound planning for billions of dollars of transportation and infrastructure investments depends upon reliable population estimates.

For the 50-year reign of suburban sprawl, forecasters could reliably predict a shrinking of Virginia city populations and growth in surrounding suburban counties. Then an inflection point occurred in the mid-2000s when population and business began reversing the trend — moving from the burbs into core urban areas. Straight-line projects based on 2000 population trends would have gotten the numbers very wrong. I would urge Lombard to reconstruct the history of population projections for the year 2020 projections going back 25 years. I suspect he would find a much wider gulf between forecast and reality than in the graph shown above.

As long as the economy is in a steady-state condition, predictions tend to be reasonably accurate. When inflection points occur, forecasts go widely astray. Today demographers must ask, how long will the urban revitalization movement last? Will cities continue to gain population? Will the growth rate of counties continue to slow? Answers to those questions are beyond the ability of demographers to predict, for they depend upon the willingness of cities and counties alike to adopt policies that promote the kind of denser, mixed-used development that can accommodate growing populations.

So, as Lombard counsels, understand the limitations of long-term demographic projections. If demographers could predict the future with 100% accuracy, they wouldn’t be demographers — they’d be making a killing on Wall Street.

Charts of the Day: Job Polarization

Virginia employment change since 2008. Source: StatChat

The good news in the ongoing evolution of Virginia’s economy is that employment in high-paying occupations has increased since 2008. The bad news is that employment in low-paying occupations has risen as well while employment in middle-class occupations is shrinking.

Kathryn Crespin with the Demographics Research Group at the University of Virginia published these charts from Bureau of Labor Statistics data in the StatChat blog.

“Job polarization is certainly not unique to Virginia,” she writes, but the trend has been more noticeable here since 2008 than in the rest of the country. … Although there has been an uptick in middle-wage job growth in Virginia over the past few years, job polarization is a nationwide, long-term trend that has developed over the past few decades and shows no signs of resolution any time soon.”

Virginia employment change since 2008. Source: StatChat

Exploring the Dark Side of the Creative Class

Richard Florida, who gained renown 15 years ago with his book, “The Rise of the Creative Class,” is a progenitor of big ideas exploring the nexus of urbanism, innovation and prosperity, and he’s back with another book and another big idea. Having documented in previous works that a handful of “superstar cities” are sucking up the lion’s share of artistic, scientific, and entrepreneurial talent and creating a wildly disproportionate share of global wealth, he delves into the dark side of urban prosperity. The title of the new book lays out his thesis succinctly: “The New Urban Crisis: How Our Cities Are Increasing Inequality, Deepening Segregation, and Failing the Middle Class—and What We Can do About It.”

The “clustering” effect – capital, corporations and talent migrating to large metro regions with deep labor markets – creates a huge economic advantage for the world’s biggest metros, and an economic advantage for dense urban centers within those metros. As the creative class grows in wealth and power, there ensues a competition for prime urban space. Prosperous inhabitants bid up the price of housing, while NIMBYs inhibit the development of new units. Soaring housing prices drive out the working and middle classes, and push the poor into enclaves segregated by income, race, and education.

The result is “winner-take-all urbanism,” says Florida. “The talented and advantaged cluster and colonize a small, select group of superstar cities, leaving everybody and everywhere else behind.” This baleful trend, he describes as the “New Urban Crisis.”

As with all of Florida’s books, “The New Urban Crisis” has much to recommend it. Florida is very good at descriptive analysis – showing what is going on. It is impossible to finish this book without agreeing with his conclusion that a handful of highly innovative supercities are more prosperous than others, that the combination of increasing demand and constricted supply are increasing the cost of housing, and that housing soaring prices in these metros are displacing the poor and middle class. Florida will convince you that prosperous cities are becoming more unequal, not less, and that the pervasive pattern of the past half century – prosperous suburbs and decaying urban cores – is being replaced by a patchwork pattern of highly affluent neighborhoods intermixed with neighborhoods of concentrated poor in both urban cores and suburbs.

Florida is far less persuasive with his prescriptive analysis. As a political liberal, he agonizes over the growing inequality within metro areas, particularly the impact on poor African-Americans. Despite the promise of the book sub-title, he devotes little attention to how metros fail the middle class. Hispanics are strangely absent from the discussion. As for whites in rural/small town America, he evinces no concern whatsoever.

As a liberal, Florida remains sublimely confident that government is the solution to what ails the U.S. He is realistic enough to acknowledge that the New Deal/Great Society paradigm is getting long in the tooth, and that America needs to realign resources to reflect 21st-century realities. He also regards the thicket of NIMBY-empowering zoning regulations and building codes as a prime cause of rising housing prices and income segregation, and argues that they need to be scaled back. But whether he’s writing about the minimum wage, mass transit and inter-city rail, and the scourge of poverty, his confidence in the beneficent power of government never flags.

In previous books, Florida attributed the success of large metropolitan areas in large part to three factors – talent, technology and tolerance. By tolerance, he means acceptance of cultural and ethnic diversity: gays, bohemians, and racial, religious and cultural minorities. In a North American context, he is undoubtedly right: Open societies do foster creativity and innovation. (I’m not sure how well his paradigm applies to Singapore, Seoul, Tokyo or cities in ethnically homogeneous countries like Sweden and Finland, but that’s an issue for another time.)

He views Republicans as retrogrades, and regards the election of Donald Trump as an unmitigated disaster. “Summoning up the political will to face up to the New Urban Crisis will be no easy thing,” he says. “And it will be ever more difficult with Donald Trump as president and the Republicans in control of both houses of Congress.”

Yet he is strangely incurious about one of his own findings: The more politically liberal the city, the greater the inequality. At least he acknowledges the phenomenon, even if he explains it away:

Our most liberal cities number among the most unequal. …. Across the United States, inequality is not just a little higher, but substantially higher, in liberal areas than in more conservative ones. … My own analysis of all 350-plus US metros found wage inequality to be positively correlated with political liberalism and negatively associated with political conservatism.

Florida never entertains the possibility that liberalism causes poverty and inequality. “Of course, inequality is not a direct product of liberal political views,” he says. “Rather, liberalism and inequality are simply both attributes of large, dense, knowledge-based metros.”

An alternative narrative would suggest that inequality arises from the juxtaposition of massive wealth creation of new industries with tragi-comic ineptitude of big-city administrations, mostly Democratic and mostly liberal. “Blue” cities are more prone to over-spending and fiscal crises. (The situation in blue-state Illinois has deteriorated to the point, we read in the news today, that the PowerBall and MegaMillion lotteries are dropping the state as a client!) Blue cities have larger under-funded pension liabilities, their taxes are more punitive, their inner-city schools are worse, their murder rates are higher, and unemployment is more chronic – all of this despite the immense advantages conferred by the presence of greater wealth to tax.

A core argument of “The New Urban Crisis” is that high housing prices are driving inequality and income segregation. Florida alludes to the work of so-called market urbanists who argue that eliminating restrictive zoning and building codes will allow developers to build as needed. “They make an important point: zoning and building codes do need to be liberalized and modernized,” he concedes. “We can no longer allow NIMBYs and New Urban Luddites to stand in the way of the dense, clustered development our cities and our economy need.”

While deregulation will help by building more housing and increasing density, he adds, the high cost of land combined with the high cost of high-rise construction will limit new construction to expensive office towers and will not create affordable housing. As evidence, he points to Houston, one of the few large metros in the U.S. where developers “can build what and where they want.” While Houston housing is more affordable than New York’s, L.A.’s or San Francisco’s, he says, it is “rather expensive” compared to that of most other metros, and the metro ranks high in his inequality and segregation indices.

I’ve never found persuasive the argument persuasive the argument that building luxury towers instead of workforce housing leads to higher housing prices for the poor. If the super-rich occupy the luxury towers, they relinquish the slightly less luxurious/preferable accommodations where they once dwelled. The merely rich move in, in turn creating vacancies in their less opulent quarters, which in turn creates openings for the merely affluent, and so on down the line. Unless Latin industrialists and Russian oligarchs are buying up all the luxury tower units as a hedge, new luxury housing eventually exerts downward pressure on housing prices down the line.

Edward Banfield described the economic logic in his classic, “The Unheavenly City.” Writing in 1968 at the height of white flight and the original urban crisis, the urban sociologist foretold the trends that Florida describes in “The New Urban Crisis.”

If present trends continue, thee will not only be more people in the cities in the next two or three decades, but a higher proportion of them will be well-off. … In this very affluent society, housing probably will be discarded at an ever faster rate than now, and the demand for living space will probably be greater. In the future, then, the process of turnover is likely to give more and better housing bargains to the not well-off, encouraging them to move even farther outward and thus eventually emptying the central city and bringing “blight” to the suburbs that were new a decade or two ago.

Eventually land in the suburbs would be worth more than land in the central city, Banfield predicted. “When this time comes, the direction of metropolitan growth will reverse itself: the well-off will move from the suburbs to the cities, probably causing editorial writers to deplore the ‘flight to the central city’ and politicians to call for government programs to check it by redevelopment the suburbs.”

Lo and behold, 40 years later, Florida describes a “suburban crisis” of flight from cheap-to-build but expensive-to-maintain suburban sprawl back into the city. At least he avoids the trap of calling for government programs to redevelop the suburbs.

Banfield didn’t foresee everything – he did not predict the growing preference for walkable, mixed-use communities in denser settings. But he understood basic economics: As the wealthy migrate to the most luxurious housing, the poor migrate to the least desirable and cheapest housing. At this stage in urban evolution, that means the poor are moving into the aging, 50s- and 60s-era ranch-style tract houses of the inner suburbs that no one else wants. That’s the affordable housing that Florida yearns for, but he does not see it for what it is.

There’s nothing that liberals love more than a good social crisis – it gives them meaning in life. As much as I appreciate Florida’s previous work, I can’t get as exercised as he does about the New Urban Crisis.

Where the Millennials Are Moving

Map credit: Time

Time has produced a confusing article on how Millennials “are moving to America’s cities,” using the terms “cities,” “urban areas,” and “metropolitan areas” interchangeably. But the main thrust of the report seems clear enough: Some metros are seeing a faster increase in the Millennial population than others. Indeed, 11 metros actually lost Millennials.

The reason the article caught my eye is that the two metros with the fastest-growing 25- to 34-year-old populations between 2010 and 2015 are…. drum roll….

No. 1: Hampton Roads — up 16.4%, a gain of 7,034.

No. 2: Richmond — up 14.9%, a gain of 5,176.

Larger metropolitan areas such as Boston, Philadelphia, Houston, Washington, Baltimore, and New York showed larger gains in absolute numbers, but the percentage increases were much lower.  It is especially satisfying to see the two Virginia metros out-performing “hot” metros such as Austin and Raleigh. Heh! Heh!

For all I know, these numbers are a statistical fluke. (Are the Hampton Roads numbers driven by an increase in young military personnel?) But, then, maybe they’re not. Maybe Hampton Roads and Richmond have a good vibe and really are luring young people. The migration portends good things for the future.

Caution: James V. Koch, an Old Dominion University economics professor (and ODU president emeritus) urges readers to view these numbers with caution. First, despite the implication of the Time article, these are not migration numbers; they are population numbers, which include not only migration but natural population increase/decrease. Second, he can’t tell where the numbers come from. The statistics he has seen show out-migration from Hampton Roads.

Boomergeddon Watch: Illinois and Puerto Rico

S&P Global has warned that Illinois’ debt could be downgraded to junk bond status if the state doesn’t get its fiscal affairs in order. Paralyzed by partisan gridlock, the Prairie State hasn’t had a budget in two years. Since the Great Depression, no other state has gone for more than a year without a budget, reports the Wall Street Journal. Meanwhile, the state’s unfunded pension liability exceeds $130 billion, and its backlog of unpaid bills has hit a record high of $14.3 billion.

If S&P, Moody’s and Fitch all downgrade Illinois debt to junk status, the state will be in violation of numerous loan covenants which could trigger more than $100 million in penalties, and make state and municipal debt even more expensive.

In parallel developments, Bloomberg reports today that the bankrupt Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has lost two percent of its population in each of the last three years. Since the economy began contracting a decade ago, the cumulative loss amounts to 400,000 residents from an island with population of 3.4 million today. By contrast, Puerto Rico’s fiscal turnaround plan assumes that the population will shrink only 0.2% each year over the next decade. Good luck with that!

The exodus means that fewer people will remain to shoulder the island’s $74 billion debt, trapping Puerto Rico in a vicious cycle of a contracting economy, cutbacks to core government services, and a population fleeing the deteriorating conditions.

Hmmm. As its turns out, Illinois is one of only seven U.S. states that experienced a population decline in 2016. Between 2000 and 2010, the population grew only 3.3%, one third the national rate. Then the population has declined every year since 2013 by a cumulative total of about six-tenths of a percent. A 2016 poll found that 47% of respondents said they would like to leave the state, citing taxes, the weather, government, and poor job opportunities in that order as the reason.

Just think what will happen when the next recession comes. Instead of Okies fleeing the Dust Bowl, we’ll see Illini fleeing the Blue State governance model.

Marriage, Fertility and Male Earnings

North Dakota fracking: higher male incomes did not translate into higher rates of marriage.

One of the great debates in the social science of poverty asks what accounts for the decline in marriage and the increase in out-of-wedlock births. There is a broad consensus among scholars of diverse ideological persuasions that children born into stable marriages tend to fare better in life than those raised by single mothers. The question is why the institution of marriage has declined so precipitously among lower-income Americans even while it remains strong and vibrant among affluent Americans.

In a new paper, “Male Earnings, Marriageable Men, and Nonmartial Fertility: Evidence from the Fracking Boom,” Melisa S. Kearney and Riley Wilson frame the issue this way:

In 2014, over 40 percent of all births in the U.S. were to an unmarried mother, with an even higher rate of 62 percent among non-college educated mothers. A leading conjecture as to why so many less-educated women are choosing motherhood without marriage points to the weak economic prospects of their male partners. The idea is that changing labor market structures and economic conditions have adversely affected the economic prospects of less educated men, making them less “marriageable” from the perspective of the women with whom they sexually partner.

Kearney and Wilson have flipped that conjecture around and hypothesize that improving earnings prospects by non-college educated males would be associated with an increase in marriage and marital childbirth. They tested that hypothesis by examining family formation between 1997 and 2012 in Census micro-areas experiencing a natural gas fracking boom, where non-college educated males experienced a jump in earnings compared to their peers in the rest of the country.

The result: “This analysis does not indicate shift toward marriage in response to an increase in the potential wages of less-educated men associated with localized fracking booms. But both marital and non-marital births increase significantly.”

The authors compared the fracking boom of the 2000s to the Appalachian coal boom of the 1970s and 1980s. Back then, in a different cultural era, increased earnings led to an increase in marriage rates, an increase in the marital birth rate, and a decline in the non-marital birth rate.”

In other words, the conjecture linking men’s income with their marriage prospects may have been valid 4o years ago, but it’s less valid today. Write Kearney and Wilson: “As non-martial births have become increasingly common, individuals are more likely to respond to increased income with increased fertility, whether or not they are married, and not necessarily an increased likelihood of marriage.”

Bacon’s bottom line: The interplay of economics and culture is incredibly complex. But the findings suggest that among a large portion of the American population, marriage is increasingly viewed as optional — regardless of the father’s economic circumstances. Further, out-of-wedlock birth is no longer stigmatized. This research calls into question the idea that blue-collar male earnings are the main stumbling block to family stability. We have passed a cultural Rubicon, and there may be no going back without a major change in values.

Feeling Pretty Good: C-ville and Lynchburg

Charlottesville ranked 6th nationally in the Gallup/Healthways ranking of community well being, Lynchburg 8th.

Charlottesville ranked 6th nationally in the Gallup/Healthways ranking of community well being, Lynchburg 8th.

When evaluating community well being, statisticians tend to focus on objective criteria such as average income, tax levels, educational achievement, life expectancy and the like. But there also are subjective criteria involving how people feel about things. Gallup Inc., the polling organization, has partnered with Healthways, a well being and wellness provider to employers, to measure how people feel.

According to the Gallup-Healthways 2016 Community Well-Being Rankings, inhabitants of two metros in Virginia are feeling pretty darned good about themselves: Charlottesville and Lynchburg. Charlottesville scored fifth out of 189 metros on the survey, Lynchburg 8th.

Virginia’s other metros didn’t fare so well. Washington ranked 44th, Richmond 106th, Virginia Beach 107th, and Roanoke 168th. The state of Virginia scored a meager 21st among the 50 states.

Definitions of Gallup-Healthways well-being categories.

The big question is, how did Charlottesville and Lynchburg do it? One thing they have in common with each other and other high-scoring metros is size. Their populations are small compared to other metros. Big metros did not fare well in this survey. Also, both are big college towns — the University of Virginia in one, Liberty University in the other. But otherwise, they would seem to have little in common. Politically, the Charlottesville area leans liberal/Democrat, Lynchburg conservative/ Republican. Charlottesville leans secular, Lynchburg leans religious.

Still, both communities scored high  in the “social” ranking — “having supportive relationships and love in  your life.” Charlottesville did especially well in the “physical” component of the index, having good health and energy, while Lynchburg excelled in its community feeling, “liking where you live, feeling safe and having pride in your community.”

Bacon’s bottom line: Gallup/Healthways provide a useful service by quantifying community attributes that aren’t captured in government statistics. There’s more to life than GDP and household income. That’s always worth remembering.