Category Archives: Demographics

Is a Washington-Baltimore-Richmond Mega-Region in Our Future?

The Boston-Washington corridor

In 2008 economic geographer Richard Florida argued in his book, “Who’s Your City?”, that the economic units that matter in understanding economic growth and development aren’t nation states, or states, or even metropolitan statistical areas. They are mega-regions — conglomerations of metropolitan areas that are increasingly bound to one another through business interactions. By Florida’s reckoning, the mega-region biggest in the United States and the second largest in the world is the Boston-Washington corridor, which extends as far south as Richmond and Hampton Roads.

I long thought of the idea of a mega-region as a meaningless abstraction — an academic concoction rather than a reflection of economic reality. Metropolitan areas, which describe definable labor markets, are the primary units of economic development. But two news stories today have forced me to consider the possibility that MSAs are not immutable if the will exists to transcend them.

First, the Greater Washington Partnership, created last year, has issued a vision statement for “the Capital Region” encompassing the Baltimore, Washington, and Richmond metropolitan statistical regions. Admittedly, that’s a far cry from a megalopolis stretching all the way to New York and Boston, but it’s a bigger than anything that exists now in Virginia or Maryland. The economy of the Capital Region, proclaims the organization’s website, is the third-largest in the United States and seventh largest in the world.

States the website: “By acting together, and focusing on super-regional solutions, we can overcome jurisdictional impediments, achieve solutions at a scale that is equal to the problems we face, and deliver new sources and engines of growth to achieve economic well-being and prosperity.”

In the Richmond Times-Dispatch today, Michael Martz quotes Dominion CEO Thomas Farrell, one of 21 corporate CEOs on the partnership’s board, as saying,  “The Greater Washington Partnership can make an impact on such pressing issues as transportation and talent, if those issues are addressed regionally.”

The overarching goal of the CEOs is to attract talent and promote innovation. A law of knowledge-economy economics, known as the agglomeration effect, is that larger regions exert greater gravitational pull on talent and corporate investment than smaller regions. The implication: Washington, Baltimore and Richmond are all stronger if they function as a single big region rather than three smaller regions. The incredible power of the agglomeration effect drives the growth of mega-regions, and it is the primary justification for building ties between neighboring regions.

Now, it’s one thing to proclaim a common identity, and another to achieve it. One can easily envision Washington and Baltimore as a single MSA because the entire swath of land between the two core cities has been filled in and developed. As a result, the labor markets of the two regions overlap to a significant degree. The same cannot be said of Washington and Richmond. But ties between Richmond and Washington, though tenuous, are emerging.

That brings me to the second news item. The Stephen Fuller Institute has just published a study, “Migration in the Washington Region: Trends between 2000 and 2015 and Characteristics of Recent Migrants.” The Washington region has a problem. While its population continues to grow as a result of foreign immigration and a surplus of births over deaths, the region has been leaking native-born citizens.

Between 2000 and 2015, Washington has experienced a net domestic migration to the Baltimore area of 77,000, and to the Hagerstown-Martinsburg area of 35,000. The number three and four recipients of Washington out-migration were Winchester (16,000) and Richmond (14,000). Charlottesville (4,000) was 15th largest recipient of domestic out-migrants. While downstate Virginia’s ties to the Washington region aren’t as strong as Maryland’s, they are still substantial. (Interestingly, Hampton Roads shipped a net 14,000 population to Washington over the same period, a pattern no doubt influenced by military ties between the two regions.)

When Washingtonians leave the metro area, by and large, they aren’t moving to New York, Boston or Philadelphia. Some are moving to retirement areas in Florida or the Eastern Shore, and a few to Charlotte and Raleigh. But the overwhelming majority are settling nearby — in the Baltimore, Hagerstown, Winchester and Richmond regions.

In other words, while the business CEOs speak grandiosely about pulling the three regions together, they aren’t trying to make something out of nothing. Below the radar screen, thousands of households making decisions of where to live and work implicitly recognize a commonality not reflected in government statistics.

If the political class buys in to the idea of a Baltimore-Washington-Richmond mega-region, the single-most important thing it can do is to knit the regions together with better transportation infrastructure. Saying this goes against my grain because I am suspicious of infrastructure mega-projects of all kinds, which invariably turn out to be boondoggles. But adopting the view of economic strategist rather than fiscal scold, I would say that top priorities would be: fixing the Washington heavy rail system, creating a higher-speed rail system from Richmond to Washington, and completing the extension of the Interstate 95 tolled express lanes to south of Fredericksburg. If we want to make a mega-region a reality, then we must invest in transportation infrastructure that enables people to move easily between the component regions.

One more thing. If Virginians want to become part of an economically competitive mega-region, they need to cast aside traditional resentments between Northern Virginia and the Rest of Virginia, NoVa and RoVa. Legislators must transcend their parochialism and prioritize projects of regional value, even if it means deferring local needs, in the expectation of everyone gaining something greater in return.

Second Chart of the Day: Unemployment

Source: Commonwealth Institute

Another chart from the Commonwealth Institute based on the latest U.S. Census data: poverty rates across Virginia metro areas.

Here’s what leaped out at me: Every single metro area, from Harrisonburg to Winchester, had a poverty rate below the statewide average of 11%. How high must the poverty rate for non-metro (aka rural) Virginia be to skew the numbers in such a way? As Augie Wallmeyer says, there are two Virginias.

Chart of the Day: Median Household Income

Source: Commonwealth Institute

Here’s the latest data on median household income from the Census Bureau, courtesy of the Commonwealth Institute. Nothing much new here: Residents of the Washington Metropolitan Statistical Area make 50% or more than inhabitants of Virginia’s other metros, more than $90,000, just like they always have.

There is a well-defined second tier: Hampton Roads (Virginia Beach-Norfolk), Richmond, Charlottesville and Winchester. I haven’t looked into it, but my porky sense tells me  (if you don’t get the feeble joke, porky sense is Bacon’s analogy to spidey sense) that Charlottesville is on the rise. All those horse country gentry and handsomely paid University of Virginia administrators may be pulling up median incomes.

The smaller metros — Roanoke, Lynchburg, Harrisonburg, Blacksburg, Staunton/Waynesboro — constitute a third income tier. And then there’s non-metro Virginia, which is not included in this chart, which I expect constitutes a fourth tier.

Overall, Virginians’ median income rose 1.8% last year. While incomes in the Old Dominion are relatively high — $68,100 statewide compared to the national median of $57,600 — the growth in income lagged the national average of 2.4%. Sequestration still haunts the commonwealth. Incomes in the Washington metro, only 1.5%, dragged down the state average. Once the highest-income metro in the United States, Washington now lags San Jose and San Francisco.

As an aside… the Commonwealth Institute notes that “communities of color” — African-Americans and Hispanics — tend to have much lower incomes on average, citing “structural barriers” such as poor schools, housing discrimination and employment discrimination. Given the fact that it was citing Census data on household income, the think tank appears to have missed an excellent opportunity to examine the contribution of household size and structure on income levels.

One of the biggest contributors to household income is the number of bread winners in the household. If African-American and Hispanic households are more likely than communities of pallor to consist of single-income households — as, in fact, they are — the breakdown of the family contributes in a direct and measurable way to reduced median household income.

Americans Increasingly Skeptical of Value of Four-Year Degrees

Graphic credit: Wall Street Journal

Americans are finally getting wise to the value of a four-year college degree. A Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll finds a significant growth in skepticism over the past four years, especially among Americans who haven’t graduated from a four-year college.

Overall, 49% of Americans believe that earning a four-year degree will lead to a good job and higher lifetime earnings, compared to 47% who don’t — a two-percentage point gap. Four years ago, that gap was 13 points.

Skeptics number in the majority — 57% to 37% — among Americans 18 to 34 years old. That should come as no surprise, as that age group has taken on a disproportionate share of the $1.3 trillion in outstanding student debt and is having the greatest trouble repaying it.

A majority of women still have faith in the four-year degree, reports the Wall Street Journal, but men’s attitude has undergone a dramatic reversal. Four years ago, men saw college as worth the cost by a 12-point margin; today they say its not, by a 10-point margin.

Many observers pushed college attendance on the astonishing superficial grounds that college graduates on average earn higher salaries and experience a lower unemployment rate than those who never went to college. What such analysis ignores is that the average earnings and unemployment for all college grads is not necessarily typical of earnings and unemployment of college grads on the margins, who were less academically prepared, received lower grades, attended less prestigious institutions. It also ignores the ugly reality of millions of Americans who racked up large debts attending college but failed to graduate.

Awareness is spreading that people can earn solid middle-class wages with a couple of years of technical training, without losing two years of earnings attending a four-year college or spending tens of thousands of tuition, fees, room, and board. The WSJ gave a great example:

Jeff McKenna, a 32-year-old from Loveland, Colo. said he doesn’t believe college is worth the cost. Mr. McKenna went to a trade school, earning a certificate as a mechanic and how earns a base salary of $50,000 a year. He said he has never gone three weeks without a job, including during the recession.

“I have friends from high school that are making half what I’m making, and they went and got a four-year degree or better, and they’re still $50, $60, $70,000 dollars in debt,” Mr. McKenna said. “There’s a huge need for skilled labor in this country.”

Indeed there is. As more people — young men, mostly — think like Jeff McKenna, there will be a growing demand for community colleges and trade schools that teach marketable blue-collar skills. Skepticism runs greatest in the college-age population, making it likely that four-year colleges will find it increasingly difficult to maintain their enrollments. Those at greatest risk are institutions that appeal to precisely those demographics — rural, lower-income, male — where skepticism runs the deepest.

As Virginia Inches Toward Becoming a Majority Minority State, What Do Racial/Ethnic Classifications Mean Anymore?

Whites will comprise less than a majority of Virginia’s population by 2040 — 47.4% — according to recent projections by the Demographics Research Group at the University of Virginia. That’s down from a forecast 58.6% in 2020.

The percentage of non-Hispanic whites and blacks in the state’s population will shrink by 5.7% and 8.3% respectively, while the percentage of Asians and Hispanics will increase by 96.0% and 114.3% respectively.

To some degree, demographic projections reflect underlying demographic reality. But they also are influenced by politics and culture, as Hamilton Lombard points out in a post yesterday on the StatChat blog. “It can be easy to read too much into very long term population projections,” he warns. “All the racial/ethnic projections only make sense if you understand the haphazard way we categorize and track race in the U.S.”

For example, a large majority of Hispanic Americans self-identify as white, but the Census Bureau categorizes them as a “non-white” minority because they also identify as Hispanic. Before 1970, they were categorized as white.

But after the Civil Rights Acts of the 1960s, the National Council of La Raza successfully lobbied to have anyone with a “Spanish origin” counted as a separate ethnic population in the 1970. Armed with data for the newly categorized Hispanic population which the 1970 census supplied, organizations could apply for various grants and develop policies specifically for Hispanic Americans. Other groups, after seeing the success of La Raza, have lobbied to have various U.S. ethnic populations counted separately. As a result, the number of race/ethnic categories on the census has risen from four in 1960 to possibly nine by 2020.

Another example of how the Census Bureau shapes perceptions of ethnicity and race: Since the Census began allowing respondents to identify as more than one race in 2000, the U.S. “mixed race” population, 86% of whom select white as one of their races, has grown from zero to nearly 10 million.

Yet another example: Census has proposed counting Middle-Eastern and North-African Americans as a separate race. Because most self-identify as white, the new classification would accelerate the decline of the “white” population and increase the “non-white” population.

Bacon’s bottom line: Two mega-trends are colliding here. On the one hand, the Great American Assimilation Machine continues to do its work, eroding ethnic and racial identities. On the other hand, by creating a racial spoils system (dispensing funds and perks to non-whites), government policy creates material incentives for people to nurture separate ethnic identities.

A century ago, white ethnic identities such as English, Scotch-Irish, Irish, Italian, German, Polish, Swedish, Jewish, etc. were as strong as racial identities today. Over time, intermarriage and the dissolution of ethnic enclaves merged white Americans into the melting pot. Today, white Americans are less likely than ever to define themselves by the national origin of their ancestors and more likely than ever to simply think of themselves as generically “white.”

The Ancestry.com ads running on cable TV are a striking illustration of this trend: There would be no need to utilize DNA to identify peoples’ ethnic origins unless most people had forgotten those origins. I thought I was Hispanic and found out I was half Italian! I thought I was German and found out I’m a mutt!

Meanwhile, the rise of “multi-racial” populations is proceeding apace. According to a Pew Research Center analysis, one-in-seven U.S. infants (14%) were multiracial or multi-ethnic in 2015, nearly triple the share in 1980. This is not just a matter of “light skinned” ethnicities intermarrying. Increasingly, Americans are broaching the color line.

One would think that all but the racial purists among us would welcome this trend. But political forces are driving the population in the opposite direction. Many politicians believe that the path to political power lies in the cultivation of racial grievances. These politicians (I won’t mention names) exist in both parties. By enabling the doling out of government spoils (usually at the behest of the political party that favors activist government — but, again, I won’t mention names), the Census Bureau’s ethnic/racial classifications perpetuate the sense of separateness.

It is impossible to predict which force — assimilation or the urge to political power — will win out in the end. But we can count on one thing: Changes in politics and culture undoubtedly will influence which races and ethnicities the Census Bureau Sam counts, and, consequently, how Americans perceive themselves. In the meantime, readers should understand Census ethnic and racial classifications for what they are: increasingly meaningless distinctions imposed and maintained for political reasons.

Rural Virginians Will be Really Old by 2040

Image credit: StatChat. Click for more legible image.

Like every other state in the union, Virginia’s population is getting older. The trend is particularly pronounced in rural jurisdictions, as seen in these maps compiled by Shonel Sen with the Demographics Research Group at the University of Virginia and published in the StatChat blog.

Everyone seems so focused on immediate problems that localities have given little attention to what things will be like in 23 years when the 65+ demographic comprises more than 20% of the population across most of the state. Given the inability of most Baby Boomers to accumulate much wealth, how many of these elders be poor? Given the tendency of young people to move away, will the rural elderly have caretakers? Given the pressures on rural hospitals and the increasingly acute shortage of doctors, will the elderly have adequate access to health care?

I suppose it’s human nature to ignore distant problems until they become immediate problems, so I’m guessing nothing will be done until these issues reach crisis proportions. This is America. That’s how we roll.

Virginia as Nation’s 10th Most Populous State?

Source: StatChat blog

Virginia’s population growth has slowed in recent years, but the Old Dominion still is expected to grow faster than the nation as a whole. At current growth rates, Virginia could become the 10th most populous state in the country by 2040, according to Shonel Sen with the Demographic Research Group at the University of Virginia.

During the 2000-2010 decade, Virginia experienced an average annual growth rate of 13%. That has slowed to a 9% growth rate in the current decade, writes Sen in the StatChat blog. But the growth rate of other states has slowed as well.

In 2010, Virginia was the 12th most populous state. Assuming current trends continue, the Old Dominion should surpass New Jersey by 2030, ranking 11th. And by 2040, Virginia will surpass Michigan to become No. 10.

The thing about most trends is that eventually they end. But insofar as the governance philosophies of states remain relatively constant, and insofar as population trends reflect state-level political and economic conditions conducive to economic growth, there is a lot of inertia in population trends in states with large, diverse economies. This scenario actually could happen.

In related commentary, Sen has published a map showing how the geographic center of Virginia’s population has moved since 1940. Just before World War II, the population center was in Cumberland County. As Richmond, Hampton Roads and Northern Virginia urbanized, the center progressively moved east through 1970. Then, as Northern Virginia came to dominate economic and population growth, the center moved due north, and is projected to continue to move north, almost to Fredericksburg, by 2040.

Map credit: StatChat

Don’t Bet the Farm on Population Projections

Source: StatChat blog

The Demographics Research Group at the University of Virginia is the entity tasked with making official population projections for the Commonwealth of Virginia and its localities. Their projections feed into all manner of planning documents across the state. If the projections are off, so are the forecasts for school attendance and transportation demand. Getting the numbers right is a big responsibility.

Hamilton Lombard, a research specialist for the group, assumes an appropriate air of humility regarding long-range projections.

Forecasting population change, like forecasting the weather, is complex, requires one to make assumptions about the future, often based on past trends, and is rarely spot on,” he writes in the StatChat blog. “Because population projections are less familiar to the public, projections are often treated as something closer to a fact, rather than a forecast that can and likely will change. Unfortunately, not understanding population projections can lead to much larger problems than a rained out barbecue.

In the chart above, Lombard traces the history of state population projections for the year 2000 beginning in 1975. The 25-year projection was off by a significant margin. But, as a rule, shorter-term projections are more accurate, and the 10-year projection hit very close to the mark.

Numbers tend to be less accurate for localities because demographic trends tend to be more volatile. As an extreme example, Lombard cites, projections made of Bath County’s population jumped around 1980 when the lightly populated county experienced an influx of construction workers to build the Bath County pump storage facility. “Because of the temporary rise in Bath County’s population,” Lombard writes, “the projections expected the county’s population to keep growing, even after the 1990 census showed that most of the power plant construction workers had left.”

Bacon’s bottom line: Forecasting increased population for Bath County by projecting a trend line based on a temporary influx of construction workers was utterly foolish. Someone should have been strung up by the thumbs. Fortunately, not much was at stake (well, not much for anyone except, perhaps, the residents of Bath County). But sound planning for billions of dollars of transportation and infrastructure investments depends upon reliable population estimates.

For the 50-year reign of suburban sprawl, forecasters could reliably predict a shrinking of Virginia city populations and growth in surrounding suburban counties. Then an inflection point occurred in the mid-2000s when population and business began reversing the trend — moving from the burbs into core urban areas. Straight-line projects based on 2000 population trends would have gotten the numbers very wrong. I would urge Lombard to reconstruct the history of population projections for the year 2020 projections going back 25 years. I suspect he would find a much wider gulf between forecast and reality than in the graph shown above.

As long as the economy is in a steady-state condition, predictions tend to be reasonably accurate. When inflection points occur, forecasts go widely astray. Today demographers must ask, how long will the urban revitalization movement last? Will cities continue to gain population? Will the growth rate of counties continue to slow? Answers to those questions are beyond the ability of demographers to predict, for they depend upon the willingness of cities and counties alike to adopt policies that promote the kind of denser, mixed-used development that can accommodate growing populations.

So, as Lombard counsels, understand the limitations of long-term demographic projections. If demographers could predict the future with 100% accuracy, they wouldn’t be demographers — they’d be making a killing on Wall Street.

Charts of the Day: Job Polarization

Virginia employment change since 2008. Source: StatChat

The good news in the ongoing evolution of Virginia’s economy is that employment in high-paying occupations has increased since 2008. The bad news is that employment in low-paying occupations has risen as well while employment in middle-class occupations is shrinking.

Kathryn Crespin with the Demographics Research Group at the University of Virginia published these charts from Bureau of Labor Statistics data in the StatChat blog.

“Job polarization is certainly not unique to Virginia,” she writes, but the trend has been more noticeable here since 2008 than in the rest of the country. … Although there has been an uptick in middle-wage job growth in Virginia over the past few years, job polarization is a nationwide, long-term trend that has developed over the past few decades and shows no signs of resolution any time soon.”

Virginia employment change since 2008. Source: StatChat

Exploring the Dark Side of the Creative Class

Richard Florida, who gained renown 15 years ago with his book, “The Rise of the Creative Class,” is a progenitor of big ideas exploring the nexus of urbanism, innovation and prosperity, and he’s back with another book and another big idea. Having documented in previous works that a handful of “superstar cities” are sucking up the lion’s share of artistic, scientific, and entrepreneurial talent and creating a wildly disproportionate share of global wealth, he delves into the dark side of urban prosperity. The title of the new book lays out his thesis succinctly: “The New Urban Crisis: How Our Cities Are Increasing Inequality, Deepening Segregation, and Failing the Middle Class—and What We Can do About It.”

The “clustering” effect – capital, corporations and talent migrating to large metro regions with deep labor markets – creates a huge economic advantage for the world’s biggest metros, and an economic advantage for dense urban centers within those metros. As the creative class grows in wealth and power, there ensues a competition for prime urban space. Prosperous inhabitants bid up the price of housing, while NIMBYs inhibit the development of new units. Soaring housing prices drive out the working and middle classes, and push the poor into enclaves segregated by income, race, and education.

The result is “winner-take-all urbanism,” says Florida. “The talented and advantaged cluster and colonize a small, select group of superstar cities, leaving everybody and everywhere else behind.” This baleful trend, he describes as the “New Urban Crisis.”

As with all of Florida’s books, “The New Urban Crisis” has much to recommend it. Florida is very good at descriptive analysis – showing what is going on. It is impossible to finish this book without agreeing with his conclusion that a handful of highly innovative supercities are more prosperous than others, that the combination of increasing demand and constricted supply are increasing the cost of housing, and that housing soaring prices in these metros are displacing the poor and middle class. Florida will convince you that prosperous cities are becoming more unequal, not less, and that the pervasive pattern of the past half century – prosperous suburbs and decaying urban cores – is being replaced by a patchwork pattern of highly affluent neighborhoods intermixed with neighborhoods of concentrated poor in both urban cores and suburbs.

Florida is far less persuasive with his prescriptive analysis. As a political liberal, he agonizes over the growing inequality within metro areas, particularly the impact on poor African-Americans. Despite the promise of the book sub-title, he devotes little attention to how metros fail the middle class. Hispanics are strangely absent from the discussion. As for whites in rural/small town America, he evinces no concern whatsoever.

As a liberal, Florida remains sublimely confident that government is the solution to what ails the U.S. He is realistic enough to acknowledge that the New Deal/Great Society paradigm is getting long in the tooth, and that America needs to realign resources to reflect 21st-century realities. He also regards the thicket of NIMBY-empowering zoning regulations and building codes as a prime cause of rising housing prices and income segregation, and argues that they need to be scaled back. But whether he’s writing about the minimum wage, mass transit and inter-city rail, and the scourge of poverty, his confidence in the beneficent power of government never flags.

In previous books, Florida attributed the success of large metropolitan areas in large part to three factors – talent, technology and tolerance. By tolerance, he means acceptance of cultural and ethnic diversity: gays, bohemians, and racial, religious and cultural minorities. In a North American context, he is undoubtedly right: Open societies do foster creativity and innovation. (I’m not sure how well his paradigm applies to Singapore, Seoul, Tokyo or cities in ethnically homogeneous countries like Sweden and Finland, but that’s an issue for another time.)

He views Republicans as retrogrades, and regards the election of Donald Trump as an unmitigated disaster. “Summoning up the political will to face up to the New Urban Crisis will be no easy thing,” he says. “And it will be ever more difficult with Donald Trump as president and the Republicans in control of both houses of Congress.”

Yet he is strangely incurious about one of his own findings: The more politically liberal the city, the greater the inequality. At least he acknowledges the phenomenon, even if he explains it away:

Our most liberal cities number among the most unequal. …. Across the United States, inequality is not just a little higher, but substantially higher, in liberal areas than in more conservative ones. … My own analysis of all 350-plus US metros found wage inequality to be positively correlated with political liberalism and negatively associated with political conservatism.

Florida never entertains the possibility that liberalism causes poverty and inequality. “Of course, inequality is not a direct product of liberal political views,” he says. “Rather, liberalism and inequality are simply both attributes of large, dense, knowledge-based metros.”

An alternative narrative would suggest that inequality arises from the juxtaposition of massive wealth creation of new industries with tragi-comic ineptitude of big-city administrations, mostly Democratic and mostly liberal. “Blue” cities are more prone to over-spending and fiscal crises. (The situation in blue-state Illinois has deteriorated to the point, we read in the news today, that the PowerBall and MegaMillion lotteries are dropping the state as a client!) Blue cities have larger under-funded pension liabilities, their taxes are more punitive, their inner-city schools are worse, their murder rates are higher, and unemployment is more chronic – all of this despite the immense advantages conferred by the presence of greater wealth to tax.

A core argument of “The New Urban Crisis” is that high housing prices are driving inequality and income segregation. Florida alludes to the work of so-called market urbanists who argue that eliminating restrictive zoning and building codes will allow developers to build as needed. “They make an important point: zoning and building codes do need to be liberalized and modernized,” he concedes. “We can no longer allow NIMBYs and New Urban Luddites to stand in the way of the dense, clustered development our cities and our economy need.”

While deregulation will help by building more housing and increasing density, he adds, the high cost of land combined with the high cost of high-rise construction will limit new construction to expensive office towers and will not create affordable housing. As evidence, he points to Houston, one of the few large metros in the U.S. where developers “can build what and where they want.” While Houston housing is more affordable than New York’s, L.A.’s or San Francisco’s, he says, it is “rather expensive” compared to that of most other metros, and the metro ranks high in his inequality and segregation indices.

I’ve never found persuasive the argument persuasive the argument that building luxury towers instead of workforce housing leads to higher housing prices for the poor. If the super-rich occupy the luxury towers, they relinquish the slightly less luxurious/preferable accommodations where they once dwelled. The merely rich move in, in turn creating vacancies in their less opulent quarters, which in turn creates openings for the merely affluent, and so on down the line. Unless Latin industrialists and Russian oligarchs are buying up all the luxury tower units as a hedge, new luxury housing eventually exerts downward pressure on housing prices down the line.

Edward Banfield described the economic logic in his classic, “The Unheavenly City.” Writing in 1968 at the height of white flight and the original urban crisis, the urban sociologist foretold the trends that Florida describes in “The New Urban Crisis.”

If present trends continue, thee will not only be more people in the cities in the next two or three decades, but a higher proportion of them will be well-off. … In this very affluent society, housing probably will be discarded at an ever faster rate than now, and the demand for living space will probably be greater. In the future, then, the process of turnover is likely to give more and better housing bargains to the not well-off, encouraging them to move even farther outward and thus eventually emptying the central city and bringing “blight” to the suburbs that were new a decade or two ago.

Eventually land in the suburbs would be worth more than land in the central city, Banfield predicted. “When this time comes, the direction of metropolitan growth will reverse itself: the well-off will move from the suburbs to the cities, probably causing editorial writers to deplore the ‘flight to the central city’ and politicians to call for government programs to check it by redevelopment the suburbs.”

Lo and behold, 40 years later, Florida describes a “suburban crisis” of flight from cheap-to-build but expensive-to-maintain suburban sprawl back into the city. At least he avoids the trap of calling for government programs to redevelop the suburbs.

Banfield didn’t foresee everything – he did not predict the growing preference for walkable, mixed-use communities in denser settings. But he understood basic economics: As the wealthy migrate to the most luxurious housing, the poor migrate to the least desirable and cheapest housing. At this stage in urban evolution, that means the poor are moving into the aging, 50s- and 60s-era ranch-style tract houses of the inner suburbs that no one else wants. That’s the affordable housing that Florida yearns for, but he does not see it for what it is.

There’s nothing that liberals love more than a good social crisis – it gives them meaning in life. As much as I appreciate Florida’s previous work, I can’t get as exercised as he does about the New Urban Crisis.