Bacon's Rebellion

James A. Bacon


 
 
 

Why War, Why Now?

 

How can Virginians justify the U.S. invasion of Iraq? Try terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, human rights and preservation of an open global trading system.


Virginia, along with the rest of America, has gone to war. Twenty-seven thousand personnel from Norfolk and Virginia Beach are deployed in the Persian Gulf. Hard fighting lies ahead as U.S. and allied forces approach Baghdad. While conflict rages overseas, the enemy has vowed to bring the war back to the United States. Terrorists may target the Pentagon, Central Intelligence Agency or other symbols of American power inside Virginia.

 

When hostilities started, Gov. Mark R. Warner quickly backed the military action in Iraq. “As a commonwealth and a nation, we must all support the president and our troops in this difficult mission," he said. "Virginians have always played a critical role in defending our national security and freedom around the world.”

 

Other politicians, even those who questioned the wisdom of using force to disarm Saddam Hussein, now wish the troops a swift victory. The willingness of men like U.S. Reps. Robert C. Scott, D-3rd, and James P. Moran, D-8th, to close ranks with their partisan opponents deserves the thanks and respect of all Virginians.

 

This is perhaps the ideal time, as Virginians ever-so-briefly put partisan differences aside, to ask ourselves: Why are we fighting this war? What kind of world are we trying to build?

 

It is a weighty matter when the United States invades a sovereign nation that posed no direct and immediate threat. What could justify such an action? Searching for answers, I turn to statements that President George W. Bush made shortly after the 9-11 tragedy. The war on terror will be long, he said, and it will be fought on many fronts. Our enemy is not only Al Qaeda, which executed the 9-11 attacks, but terrorists of all stripes and the foreign states that give them sanctuary.

 

Many of America’s traditional allies, including the Germans, backed our invasion of Afghanistan, where Al Qaeda functioned as a state-within-

a-state, and continue to lend assistance in peace-keeping and reconstruction there. Americans should acknowledge and express gratitude for that support, even if some allies have parted company in our decision to disarm Saddam Hussein. At the same time, expelling Al Qaeda from Afghanistan hardly marks the end of the war against terrorism. Even capturing or killing Osama Bin Ladin will not prove decisive.

 

Stopping the war after victory in Afghanistan would be akin to the United States calling it quits after expelling Hitler’s Afrika Korps from Tunisia. The liberation of Iraq is the second campaign in the War on Terror, just as the liberation of Italy was the second campaign in the European theater of World War II. And, though many people will not want to hear it, the War on Terror won’t end with the removal of Saddam Hussein from power any more than the struggle against fascism ended when Italian partisans strung up a Benito Mussolini’s corpse from a lamppost. Al Qaeda is only one terrorist organization. There are many others. Hussein’s Iraq is only one country harboring terrorists and bent upon obtaining weapons of mass destruction. There are others.

 

During the Cold War, the U.S. developed a simple but useful frame of reference for viewing global events: There was the “first” world, America and its friends. There was the “second” world, consisting of communist nations. Then there was the “third” world, comprised of largely poor, mainly agricultural nations for whose loyalties the other two contended. With the collapse of communism, Americans have not yet developed a coherent framework for viewing emerging lines of conflict in the world – at least, not until Thomas P.M. Barnett came along.

 

Barnett, a professor at the U.S. Naval War College, divides the world between those regions that are integrated into the global trading system and those that are not. In the March 2003 issue of Esquire, he writes: “Show me where globalization is thick with network connectivity, financial transactions, liberal media flows, and collective security, and I will show you regions featuring stable governments, rising standards of living, and more deaths by suicide than murder. These parts of the world I call the Functioning Core, or Core. But show me where globalization is thinning or just plain absent, and I will show you regions plagued by politically repressive regimes, widespread poverty and disease, routine mass murder, and—most important—the chronic conflicts that incubate the next generation of global terrorists. These parts of the world I call the Non-Integrating Gap, or Gap.” 

 

The entire Middle East falls within the “Gap.” With the possible exception of sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East is the location of the most dysfunctional states on the globe. But unlike sub-Saharan Africa, which poses no threat to the U.S. or other democracies, the militant Islamic fundamentalism bubbling up from the Middle East most certainly is. The Middle East breeds anarchy and exports terror. And Middle Eastern nations, thanks in good measure to their oil riches, possess the means to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, and long-range missiles to deliver them.

 

To wipe out the twin threats posed by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, the U.S. must address the “root cause” of violence. The root of violence is not poverty per se, but the autocratic and corrupt rule of non-democratic governments that prevent their nations from participating in the wealth-creating “core.” Most Middle Eastern states are miserable failures; after a half century of self governance, they have proven incapable of meeting the aspirations of their citizens. Among those nations possessing oil wealth, most have squandered it; among those possessing no oil, most have plunged their people into poverty and misery. In any democratic society, voters would have thrown the bums out long ago.

 

Rather than accept responsibility for their failures, ruling elites look for scapegoats. In the victimist worldview of the Middle East, there are two: Israel and the United States. Ruling elites clamp down on criticism of their own regimes but tolerate outcries against Israel, the Zionist oppressor of the Palestinians, and the U.S., supporter of Israel and bullying superpower. Deep popular frustration manifests itself in the only way that it is permitted, in hatred of Israel and the U.S.

 

I do not pretend that the U.S. is entirely blameless. Central to the post-WWII history of the Middle East was the struggle of the ruling elites of newly independent countries to wrest control over their petroleum resources from U.S. and European oil companies. Further, during the Cold War decades, the U.S. inflamed nationalist passions by supporting unpopular rulers like the Shah of Iran. But those tensions are long past. Middle Easterners appear to have forgiven France for its colonial rule over Lebanon and Syria, not to mention its bloody war to maintain colonial rule of Muslim Algeria. They would forgive our transgressions, too, were not other forces feeding their resentment.

 

Here is the crux of the problem: The U.S. champions the values of open, democratic political systems and dynamic, market-driven economies – principles which many Middle Easterners rightly regard as a threat to their traditional social order. Emulating the U.S. model would undermine power structures based largely on patronage, the subordination of women and tribal-collectivist values. Likewise, many Middle Easterners regard the sexual permissiveness of Western society, with attendant practices such as abortion and pornography, as morally repugnant.

 

Where Middle Eastern societies value tradition and stability, the United States embraces dynamism and change. More than any other people, Americans are open to disruptive technologies, to fresh ideas and to living and working beside people from all walks of life. We have built our prosperity on the free movement of goods, capital, information, technology and, above all, people. We are committed to the ideals of an ethnically pluralistic society grounded in democracy, respect for individual rights and economic freedom.

 

Critics of the war in Iraq contend that the U.S. is hooked on oil. They miss the point. We’re hooked on an open global trading system that allows us to import oil, or energy, at a fraction of what it would cost us to produce it ourselves, and allow us to pay for it by exporting PCs, medical equipment, software and Hollywood films. Anything that undermines this open trading system – a system that defines our relationship not only with Middle Eastern nations but with all nations – threatens the economic foundation of the United States and other economically advanced nations. (A shared antipathy for the open global economy, I believe, explains why anti-global leftists around the world protest the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s fascist regime.)

 

Americans don't like war. We'd like nothing better than to declare, "A pox upon all your houses," seal ourselves off from the rest of the world, and let someone else deal with the Saddam Husseins and Kim Il Jungs. But, as much as we’d like to, the U.S. cannot turn its back on the Middle East. No other nation has the military capability to take on Saddam Hussein -- certainly not France, Germany or Russia.

 

In the long run, the only way to protect ourselves from Saddam Husseins and Osama Bin Ladins is to promote the modernization of Middle Eastern societies and their integration into the core global trading system. I certainly do not advocate some simple-minded notion that we can implant American-style democracy in foreign cultures. But we can help Middle Eastern peoples create governments that are more representative, more pluralistic and more respectful of human rights than they are now. We can help Middle Eastern governments institute the rule of law, free their economies from socialism and corruption, and expand economic opportunity for all their citizens.

 

Most relevant to the point at hand, we can help create institutions that enable Middle Eastern peoples to better their own lives rather than redirect their frustration and fury against the U.S.

 

Why Iraq? Yes, we all agree, Saddam Hussein is a murderous dictator with a penchant for invading neighbors and accumulating weapons of mass destruction. But what’s wrong with “containment”? Why not keep him “in his box? Although Hussein clearly would like to acquire nuclear weapons, there’s no evidence that he’s near getting them. Are a few hundred warheads on short- and intermediate-range rockets loaded with chemical and biological weapons enough to conquer and intimidate his neighbors? He gassed the Iranians but did not defeat them – and that was before the Gulf War and international sanctions had gutted the power of his military machine.

 

There are two arguments for preferring “regime change” to containment. First, Hussein is defiant and unrepentant. The trade sanctions are only partially effective. By brokering the flow of “humanitarian” relief to his own people, he solidified his power and acquired resources to continue building his weapons of mass destruction. A lifting of the U.N. sanctions – supported by many in Europe -- would allow him to resume his ambitious plans full throttle. French corporations are happy to help him develop his oilfields and redevelop his military, including weapons of mass destruction. Hussein consented to receive inspectors back into his country only because the U.S. and its allies sat on his borders, prepared to invade. How long does the U.S. have the patience, at the cost of a billion dollars or more per month and continued diplomatic tangling with the French, to hold the knife to his throat? All it takes is a (democratic) regime change in the United States and the troops might well come home. Then Hussein is unleashed.

 

Secondly, Hussein remains a destabilizing force in the Middle East. It is common knowledge that he has nourished the suicide cult of Palestinian terrorists by paying $25,000 to the families of “martyrs.” It is an indisputable fact that he has hosted numerous terrorist organizations in Iraq, including the Palestine Liberation Front, responsible for the Achille Lauro hijacking; the Mujahedin-e Khalq, which conducts terrorist operations in Iran; and the now-deceased terrorist mastermind Abu Nidal, mysteriously assassinated in his Baghdad apartment last year, who was responsible for terrorist acts in more than 20 countries. The notorious Hamas organization also has an office in Baghdad.

 

Al Qaeda seems to be the one terrorist organization that Hussein has not actively collaborated with until recently. In a recent speech to the U.N., however, Secretary of State Colin Powell documented that connections between Hussein and Al Qaeda have grown in recent years. Most notably, Abu Musah Al-Zarqawi, believed to be responsible for the murder of American diplomat Lawrence Foley in Jordan last year, runs a terrorist training camp in Iraq. Though Powell's evidence was suggestive, I will concede, it did not constitute hard proof. Anyone predisposed to disagree with the Bush administration has reasonable grounds for skepticism.

 

But it strikes me as obtuse to think that liberating Iraq would not bolster the War on Terror. The liberation of Afghanistan yielded a treasure trove of intelligence from captured computers and files that have helped unravel the Al Qaeda organization over the past year. Similarly, the liberation of Iraq would give the U.S. access to the files of Saddam Hussein’s infamous intelligence service, the Mukhabarat --- assuming the files haven’t all been destroyed in the devastating cruise missile attacks on Hussein’s command structure. If the War on Terror were dedicated exclusively to extinguishing Al Qaeda, the intelligence findings might be meager – we simply won’t know how extensive the ties are until we enter Baghdad. But if our goal is to combat all Middle Eastern terrorist organizations that have targeted Americans in the past, then we can expect an intelligence bonanza.

 

At a minimum, achieving “regime change” in Iraq will advance the War on Terror by depriving terrorist organizations of an important safe harbor and financial supporter. In the best of all worlds, gaining access to the Mukhabarat’s files would help us unravel terrorist cells around the world.

 

Iraq is the linchpin for altering the geopolitics of the Middle East. The post-Hussein regime could become the first true Arab democracy. The oil-rich sheikhdoms of Kuwait and Qatar have made progress in introducing parliamentary government and respecting human rights, but still remain constitutional monarchies. A democratic Iraq could change the terms of debate in every Middle Eastern country.

 

Skeptics may rightly ask whether democratizing Iraq will prove to be an exercise in futility. The U.S. successfully introduced democracy to Germany and Japan after World War II, but both nations were economically advanced, with educated and largely urban populations, and had previous experience with democracy. Iraq in the modern era, by contrast, has been ruled in turns by a colonial power, a monarchy and a totalitarian regime. The country is divided ethnically between Sunni and Shia Muslims, Kurds, Assyrians and Turkish peoples. Whether these groups, after decades of oppression, can “agree to disagree” in a pluralistic, democratic society is open to question.

 

As long as we accept that the Iraqis are not likely to achieve Western-style standards of democracy and human rights right away, there good reasons to think that democracy will work in Iraq better than it has in other hot spots where the U.S. has undertaken nation building, such as Haiti, Somalia and, most recently, Afghanistan.

 

·         Iraq has a tradition of strong central government, which may help prevent the fission into fragmented tribal entities that occurred in Afghanistan.

 

·         Hussein will leave utterly discredited. There will be no nostalgia for Baath party rule. At the same time, Islamic fundamentalism never took root under his despotic rule. Although the country could conceivably revert to tribal warlordism, there are no obvious ideological alternatives to democracy.

 

·         By Middle Eastern standards, Iraq has a well educated population with a large middle class – or at least it did before Hussein’s military adventurism impoverished the nation.

 

·         Literally millions of Iraqis have fled the country. Presumably, the exile population has been inculcated, to some degree, with the norms of democratic societies. Thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, of them will return to help build a democracy.

 

·         Unlike Afghanistan, Iraq possesses extraordinary oil wealth that can be used to rebuild the nation’s infrastructure. This wealth, combined with the renunciation of weapons of mass destruction and a downsizing of the military, will make it possible to improve living standards rapidly. Prosperity after decades of deprivation should enhance the legitimacy of democratic rule.

 

·         The U.S. appears willing to make a serious, long-term commitment to nation building in Iraq, which it did not in either Haiti or Somalia. As in Afghanistan, we can help Iraqis forge a new military force accustomed to civilian control. The presence of U.S. forces will ensure that the new military does not engage in any coups or putsches.

 

Critics of regime change fret that the U.S. commitment to Iraq could last years. That should come as no surprise, nor should it impose undue hardship. The U.S. has stationed troops in South Korea and Japan for more than 50 years without excessive strain to protect those nations from aggression.

 

The U.S. presence in South Korea is less welcome than in the past. Were it not for the belligerent behavior of the Kim Il Jung regime, one could advance the argument that our military forces were no longer needed there. One also wonders why the U.S. maintains more than a nominal military presence in Europe. We could avoid “imperial overstretch” by shuttering outdated, Cold War outposts and shifting military assets to where they're really needed: the Middle East.

 

Foes of the American invasion of Iraq raise one other legitimate concern: By fueling hatred of the United States, we will only help terrorists recruit more followers. Thousands of Muslims will join the “jihad” against the Great Satan.

 

Yes, that is a risk. But there will be many benefits to overthrowing Saddam Hussein.

 

·         Hussein supported terrorism. Toppling his regime will deprive terrorists of financial support and a safe haven.

 

·         Intelligence from Mukhabarat archives will allow us to identify and track down terrorist cells.

 

·         Fury at the United States will be mitigated by scenes of Iraqis greeting the allies as liberators.

 

·         A democratic government in Iraq will provide an ideological alternative to fundamentalist Islam.

 

·         The new balance of power will diminish state support for terrorism by other states, such as Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia.

 

The display of U.S. military power and political is already changing the political calculus of the Middle East. There are reports that the Syrian regime is reining in its support for terrorists. Syrian dictator Bashar al-Asad does not want to replicate Saddam Hussein’s fall from power. Meanwhile, moderate Palestinians appear to be gaining the upper hand against Yasser Arafat. The futility of the Intifada and the loss of the radical Palestinians’ greatest ally, Iraq, may create an opening for peace talks with Israel.

 

When the war in Iraq is over, the U.S. will take a respite from its military exertions. We then should turn our diplomatic attention to Iran and Saudi Arabia.

 

The Iranian clerics, unrelenting foes of Israel, have underwritten the radical Hamas and Hezbollah terrorist organizations. Iran also has funneled funding, training and logistics assistance to extremist groups in the Gulf, Africa, Turkey and Central Asia. Unlike Hussein in Iraq, however, the clerics do not exercise totalitarian control over the country. Considerable power is vested in a freely elected parliament, and the judiciary is semi autonomous. As evidenced by massive demonstrations, the reform movement enjoys great strength. Heartened by events in Iraq, reformers may succeed in wresting power from the mullahs. The U.S. should back the reformers, but subtly, so as not to incur a nationalist backlash or accusations of meddling.

 

Saudi Arabia may not harbor terrorist organizations but the ruling sheikhs are clearly complicit in exporting their fundamentalist brand of Islam, Wahhabiism, to other nations. The Saudis fund the madrassas, religious schools from Pakistan to Malaysia, that teach a strict, medieval version of Islam and inculcate hatred of Israel and the United States. It also is well documented that individual Saudis have bankrolled Al Qaeda and other terrorist movements. Finally, there is something about the closed Saudi society itself that breeds a fanatic odium towards the U.S.: Let us not forget that most of the 9-11 hijackers were Saudi nationals.

 

Americans have long considered the Saudis as friends. Indeed, Saudi Arabia has lent its airfields to the U.S. to prosecute the war against its old enemy, Saddam Hussein, and as a leader of OPEC, the country has worked to stabilize oil prices – not for charitable reasons, of course, but to ensure that the U.S. and other industrial nations never feel compelled to kick their oil dependency. Once the war against Iraq is complete, the U.S. will have re-evaluate its "friendship" with the Saudi monarchy and consider backing a democratic reform movement there.

 

As a long-term policy, the U.S. should vigorously nudge Middle Eastern countries to reform their political and economic structures. At the risk of repeating myself, I stress that it would be foolhardy to hold Middle Eastern nations to impossible standards of democratic perfection. The U.S. and other democracies took centuries to get where they are today, and we still don't always get it right.

 

Middle Easterners must find their own way. They must work out their own visions of society, informed perhaps by Western experience, but in line with their own religions, their own values, their own history. We probably won't always like what we see -- anti-Americanism thrives in Latin American democracies as well, so we should not be surprised if it surfaces in Middle Eastern democracies. But anti-Americanism in Latin America is tolerable because it is not coupled with militarism and a quest for weapons of mass destruction. Societies that give people a voice in government, respect human rights and grant economic freedoms tend to eschew military adventurism and integrate more readily into the global trading system than those that don’t. Open societies achieve greater material progress, don't squander their wealth acquiring weapons of mass destruction, and don't breed the foot soldiers of terrorism.

 

The United States is not an imperialist power. We have no interest in conquering countries or creating an “empire.” As Americans, our goal is to liberate people from tyranny because we believe that a world inhabited by a free and prosperous people also is the safest world.

 

-- March 24, 2003

 

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