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Politics
Made VDOT a Sorry Mess
But
the Warner administration is determined to restore
it to the professional organization it once was,
says former Transportation Commissioner Ray
Pethtel.
I
read with interest Joshua Lief's column in
Bacon’s Rebellion expressing his views about
VDOT and the transportation referenda. ("Means
of Last Resort,"
August 12.)
I agree that VDOT needs to improve its
administrative capability.
I know the new VDOT leadership is doing so
as fast as possible. However, I also believe the referenda are
essential now for both
Northern Virginia
and Hampton Roads. I
worry that if they are defeated, Virginia
will not get legislative support for any
transportation funding initiative for years to
come. I
worry, too, that people might find fault with the
bond issues because of a perception that “VDOT
is out of control.”
That is far from reality.
Let me acquaint you with a different
perspective.
I
had the privilege of serving as Transportation
Commissioner (and as Chairman and Vice Chairman of
the Commonwealth Transportation Board) for eight
years -- 1986 to 1994.
I had the honor to serve again, as Interim
Commissioner, for the first four months of
Governor Warner’s administration.
Frankly, I was disturbed to see the way
VDOT’s administrative systems had been allowed
to deteriorate. I
had an intense interest in seeing those processes
upgraded and improved.
However, as I began to wade into the
administrative and financial quagmire, I found
that much of the blame and criticism heaped on
VDOT employees was misdirected.
Some of that criticism should be directed
at recent political leadership.
Today, VDOT is being unfairly used as a
convenient target for those opposed to the
referenda. I
realize some will see my remarks as simply
“politics,” but there is documentation that
will confirm my comments.
As
an aside, let me acknowledge that I do not believe
we can hold public officials accountable for their
policy positions in the same way we hold private
officials accountable (a la Enron).
Nevertheless, with
Virginia’s single four-year administrations, there needs
to be some way that public officials are held to
account for the condition in which they leave the
Commonwealth. I
think public accountability is as important as
corporate accountability. That leads to the
question: What caused the problems at VDOT?
In
all my years of association with highway funding,
construction, maintenance, and operations in Virginia, I have heard very little criticism of the
quality of construction, maintenance, or
operations undertaken by VDOT.
In fact, a statewide customer survey taken
once during my initial tenure and repeated
recently found that the vast majority of citizens
think VDOT does a good job.
You can see the results on the VDOT web
site. I
believe this positive view by the public is
because that work is not the province of political
influence; it is the province of the professional
VDOT staff.
Without
doubt, the philosophy of the last several
administrations changed Virginia’s public/private institutional relationships.
Governor Allen’s administration was
private-sector oriented.
There was a feeling that the private sector
could do the same work better, faster, and
cheaper. DOT
was downsized by use of an early retirement
program. The
VDOT staff competence suffered because senior
employees were encouraged to take early
retirement, and nearly 1,250 did.
Private consultants were then hired to do
the necessary work — a good number of them
former VDOT employees.
Recent studies by JLARC and VDOT both
concluded it costs more to do work with private
forces: VDOT’s analysis found the difference in
cost is between 25 percent and 45 percent more.
Therefore, from a cost standpoint, it is
important to balance internal staff work with
external consultants.
With regard to quality and timeliness, it
takes the private sector the same amount of time
to develop transportation projects.
Federal and State statutes govern most
construction whether done by VDOT or by a private
company. Downsizing
VDOT and privatizing its workload was a political
decision based largely on ideology, and those
initiatives diminished the department’s ability
to handle its workload.
That started the breakdown of several
important management processes and systems.
Governor
Gilmore tried to gear up a massive long-term
construction program using risky short-term
revenue measures. A
policy decision was made to use debt to sustain a
program, which mortgaged too much of
Virginia’s future revenues.
The Governor proposed to bind future
general assemblies and Governors to appropriate
General Funds for transportation, a plan that
quickly fell apart.
In addition, the administration did not
respond to frequent staff warnings of the
impending financial crisis that was exacerbated by
the downturn in the economy.
The
cash management crisis VDOT faces today was
clearly forecast many times between 1997 and 2001
by staff with warnings to every appropriate member
of the Transportation Secretariat and the Governor
and his staff. Key
committees of the General Assembly were informed,
several times by their own staff.
There was documentation in memo after memo
cautioning that the construction program had to be
slowed down to avoid a cash crunch.
Instead of slowing the program, VDOT was
given a charge to speed it up.
The administrative funding that might have
upgraded computer systems, provided staff
training, or corrected other deficiencies was
reduced. Maintenance
funding was programmed to be held flat for the
next six years. The
administrative budget had already been held flat
for at least three prior years, as I recall.
In
the late 1990s, after VDOT had reduced its staff
by as many as 2,000 senior personnel, Governor
Gilmore said Virginia
would have the “largest construction program in Virginia’s history”. He
authorized about 400 new jobs.
One day after the Warner administration took
office, we found we could not pay for it; nor
would VDOT have been in position to manage it.
Staff levels were down to the lowest level
since the early 1980s.
I have to commend Commissioner Shucet for
trying to make do with the staff he has, but
personally, I don’t think it is enough.
For
comparison purposes, VDOT had a 10,000 person
workforce in 1980, more than two decades ago.
In the mid-'80s, the General Assembly
authorized 2,000 more jobs to help manage system
wide growth and the Baliles construction
initiative. Today,
after another 15 years of growth in the highway
system and a construction program that has more
than tripled, VDOT staff levels are again down to
10,000 persons.
Complicating
this executive leadership direction, the 2000
General Assembly broke with the Governor
Gilmore’s proposals and passed legislation that
specified where, when, and how much was to be
spent on hundreds of high cost projects.
To the best of my knowledge, there was
little regard, if any, for real estimates of
project costs, environmental or community
development difficulties, or the impact of limited
human resources on VDOT’s ability to manage the
program. In
fact, during my brief tenure, I experienced the
irony of having $400 million in the bank that I
could not spend because of that legislation.
The Transportation Act of 2000 was, in the
most polite words I can use, a disaster for VDOT.
With
regard to the recent audit report, which has been
widely reported, I was among those advisors to
Governor Warner who recommended that the Auditor
of Public Accounts be asked to do a special
operational audit. An
independent report that laid out all the
management issues and a commitment to change was
the only way to revive VDOT’s credibility with
important transportation decision-makers.
The audit report will be useful.
It confirms much of what JLARC reported;
what an expert panel I assembled found; and what
VDOT staff reported to me.
But the report states on the very first
page that the changes can only be made with
assistance from the General Assembly (giving
VDOT greater flexibility and better funding),
the Governor (authorizing
more staff and budget for systems and resource
up-grades), and better interaction with the
Commonwealth Transportation Board (giving
better review and oversight of financing and
program growth initiatives).
These persons constitute the political
leadership in Virginia. (My
emphasis)
My
concluding point is this: There are many things
that can be done to improve transportation in Virginia. Administrative
improvement is one; more money is another.
Responsible political leadership and
direction is yet another important consideration.
I am impressed that Governor Warner is serious
about restoring professional leadership to VDOT.
I am impressed with the appointment of
Whitt Clement as Secretary and Philip Shucet as
Commissioner. And
I am confident that with less politics, reasonable
political direction, adequate professional staff
and program leadership, and sufficient financial
resources, VDOT will be ready for any challenge
put before it. We
do not gain a thing by waiting for more reports.
Our transportation crisis is with us now.
I urge citizens of
Northern Virginia
and Hampton Roads to support the referenda.
Then, I hope we can find a financial
solution for the rest of the Commonwealth as well.
Ray
D. Pethtel
University
Transportation Fellow
Virginia
Tech
(540)
231-1546
rpethtel@vt.edu
-- Sept. 3,
2002
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